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A generous confession
disarms slander.
Thomas Fuller (M.D.).
Gnomologia No. 26 (1732)
It is when the gods hate a
man with uncommon abhorrence
that they drive him into the
profession of a schoolmaster.
Senaca
I. INTRODUCTION
The pages of The American Lawyer recently carried an article
styled "Advising Colleagues On the Ethics Minefield." 1 The essential ele-
ments of its message were that there is an ethics "minefield" out there,
and that there is also considerable unsatisfied demand among lawyers
for "paid" '2 legal ethics consultants.
Characteristically, the body of the article did not dwell on the size
or shape of the "ethics minefield," or provide a map through it, but
instead concentrated on the names of firms and individuals said to be
emerging as leaders in the business of providing ethics counseling and
expert witness services. This pitch appeared under the magazine's reg-
1. December 1989, p. 3. For a similar "promo" that rounds up and touts "the
usual suspects" see Goodrich, Ethics Business, CAL. LAW. 36 July, 1991, at 36.
2. I use the term "paid" to distinguish such consultants from volunteer members
of state and local ethics committees, members of law firms that are sufficiently
respected or otherwise powerful enough to pass up enough "billables" to allow them
to serve as "in house" ethicists, and that handful of public spirited academics who have
not yet incorporated themselves, are not fully booked up on "Nightline," and are will-
ing to advise their former students pro bono publico. "Blessed are they who expect
nothing, for they shall not be disappointed." Shepard, Breaking into the Profession:
Establishing a Law Practice in Antebellum Virginia, 48 J. S. HIST. 393, 409 (1982) (quoting
a 19th Century practitioner).
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ular heading of "Product-Development." 3
This "market," or the market for this "product," was also dis-
cussed at a recent meeting of the National Organization of Bar Counsel
and in a companion program of the Association of Professional Respon-
sibility Lawyers. At these meetings, no less a luminary that the Reporter
for the ABA Model Rules alluded to the "pitfalls inherent in [bar associa-
tion ethics] 'hotline' arrangement[s]. ' 4 Other experts presented pro-
grams along the lines of "How to Market Yourself as a Professional
Responsibility Lawyer." 5 Intended or not, one is left with the following
impressions: that lawyers are being targeted, if not by clients then by
other lawyers (if not as defendants then as clients); that our ethics rules
are more or less indecipherable to anyone other than a specialist; and
that practitioners had better take their questions to paid legal ethics
consultants if they know what's good for them.
Assuming, arguendo, that the average lawyer can no longer iden-
tify and research a question of legal ethics or-potential legal liability,6
whatever happened to bar association ethics committees? According
to academics, at least, these traditional sources of professional advice
are staffed by the inexperienced or incompetent, and when operating
at their best are inefficient and unresponsive. Bar committee proce-
dures deny interested parties their deserved portions of daylight and
due process. And, strangely enough, bar committees accomplish all of
this studied, and presumably significant unfairness while inviting only
"niggling and peripheral questions of a kind that might be raised about
one's conduct on a lawyer's own letterhead." 7
This article responds to the critics of state bar ethics committees.
Indirectly, it raises some questions about the need, or at least the ex-
tent of the need, for yet another law-related cottage industry (the for-
hire legal ethics consultant). It also provides some friendly advice for
those well-meaning types in every jurisdiction who are perennially "re-
forming" or "energizing" their bar associations and demanding for the
"membership" a dazzling new array of services. It discusses practical
3. "Ours is a learned profession, not a mere money-getting trade." Anon.
4. See ABA/BNA Law. Man. Prof. Con. 37 (Vol. 7, 1991) reporting the proceedings
of the Midyear Meeting of the NOBC.
5. The title of a presentation listed in the Agenda of the APRLA for its Feb. 8, 1991
meeting in Seattle, Washington.
6. As opposed to "will not" -see parts II and IV. Hopefully it is not contended
that the average lawyer cannot read, understand, and research the Model Rules. See
the passing reference to "due process" considerations in part Ill.
7. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 66-67 (1986).
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problems that have gone unmentioned in the limited literature, just as it
takes issue with many of the assertions that have been made in that
literature.
Of course, the real aim of the article is to give the reader some
observations, and some comments about other peoples' observations,
from the point of view of a member of the much maligned "Ethics
Committee." I also hope that I may be forgiven for making a few irrev-
erent remarks on the subject of lawyers and lawyers' ethics, the misuse
of the professional codes, and the abuse of bar committees. After
practicing law, teaching legal ethics for eleven years at a state univer-
sity, chairing a state bar ethics committee for seven years, serving as
the chairman of a state's Model Rules committee, and co-authoring an
eerily unread but "pithy" 8 book on ethics in litigation, it would be un-
natural if I did not have a few personal anecdotes, comments and com-
plaints to offer. Having suffered the part of the "schoolmaster," it is my
turn to whine a bit.
A. Discipline, the Courts, and Ethics Committees
From my perspective, laymen and lawyers alike seem hopelessly
confused about the roles of disciplinary agencies. (which serve a
prosecutorial function triggered by client, attorney, or court complaints
of acts of misconduct) the courts (which are charged with the supervi-
sory function of policing the conduct of lawyers practicing before
them), and national, state, and local bar associations (which serve in an
interpretive or advisory capacity) in "enforcing" professional
standards. 9
The work of lawyer disciplinary agencies is initiated by the filing of
complaints with the bar counsel. Students of the disciplinary system are
all in agreement that reports by lawyers of the ethical misconduct of
other lawyers account for a relatively small percentage of the workload
of disciplinary agencies.' 0 Critics of the disciplinary system argue that
the same socio-economic and emotional pressures that militate against
lawyer reporting also militate against judicial reporting or involvement
8. Trial, Vol. 25 No. 5 (May 1989). I was upset until I looked up "pithy" in the
dictionary. A Canadian reviewer speaks of "l'ouvrage eclaire d'une maniere particulier-
ement vivante le deroulement d'un litige." I still do not know what that means.
9. Part of the material in this section (IA) first appeared in Chapter 20 of RICHARD H.
UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS (1988).
10. John M. Levy, The Judge's Role in the Enforcement of Ethics - Fear and Learn-
ing in the Profession, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 103 (1982).
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in informal discipline.11 Accordingly, most complaints to bar counsel
come from laymen (clients), and describe the sort of deeds that are
easily discovered, understood, and described by laymen. 12 So it should
come as no surprise that actual disciplinary adjudications resulting in se-
rious discipline tend to involve instances of conversion, fraud, or other
felony conduct, and unwelcome solicitation.13 Other types of miscon-
duct, such as inadequate preparation, failure to show up on scheduled
court dates, presentation of false testimony or false or distorted docu-
mentary evidence, the filing of sham pleadings, instances of discovery
abuse, and even conflicts of interest, are likely to surface only as a
result of the diligence of the court or the willingness of opposing coun-
sel to raise them.1 4 Opposing counsel bring them to the attention of
the court (by way of a motion to disqualify, a motion for money sanc-
tions, or a motion for exclusion of evidence) only when there is some
"tactical" advantage to be gained.15 In all but the most egregious cir-
cumstances no parallel bar complaint (request for disciplinary action) is
filed.16
Insofar as judicial enforcement is concerned, it is common knowl-
edge that many judges view the injection of ethical issues into lawsuits
11. Id. at 106.
12. Kentucky statistics relating to complaints filed during the period Oct. 29, 1990
to Nov. 29, 1990, reveal that 36% of complaints were based on a lawyer's alleged
failure to communicate with his or her client (Rule 1.4) or alleged failure to act with
reasonable diligence (Rule 1.3). Roughly 9% of filings complained of "unreasonable
fees" (Rule 1.5(a)), and another 8% (roughly) alleged that a lawyer did not surrender
papers or property to his or her client or refund "unearned" fees (Rule 1.6(d)). See
Clooney, The Disciplinary Process and Often Heard Complaints, 13 THE ADVOCATE No. 3
46-49 (Apr. 1991). Bar counsel (the "prosecutor") may or may not have the time to
interview a dissatisfied client and translate his or her disappointment into an intelligible
bar complaint. This suggests an interesting opportunity for pro bono work, though one
doubts that lawyers will queue up to provide it.
13. F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession:
Is It Self-Regulation?, U. ILL. L.F. 193, 195-217 (1974).
14. See generally The Judicial Response to Lawyer Misconduct (ABA Standing
Committee on Professional Discipline 1984).
15. Is there an incentive or duty to report to the disadvantage of his or her client?
See RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS § 20.2.2 (1988). But see In
re Himmel, 125 I11. 2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988).
16. The trial court could be viewed as a "tribunal" or "professional authority" for
reporting purposes (DR 1-103(A) and Model Rule 8.3) and a judicial resolution of a
complaint might eliminate the need for further reporting. See RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD &
WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS § 20.3.3 (Supp. 1990).
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as mere tactical ploys, 17 diverting the court from its "primary business
of disposing of cases."' 18 Judicial activity has varied depending upon the
individual judge's perception of the relative importance of doing some-
thing about lawyer misconduct.19 Furthermore, many judges are unfa-
miliar with the lawyer codes and related gloss. Many more judges at-
tempt to refer questions and disputes to bar counsel (the office of
disciplinary counsel) or the bar association's ethics committee. This can
result in unnecessary delay to the litigants, and deprive them of a
meaningful opportunity for a hearing as well as an effective remedy.
"Initiating" disciplinary action (to use the terminology of Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct) by referring a matter to bar counsel may not
protect the interests of the complaining party-litigant, since the remedy
most appropriate for a particular situation may be disqualification of
counsel, the preclusion of evidence, or the like, rather than an after the
fact (and an after the injury) reprimand or suspension.20 Moreover, a
"forward pass" to bar counsel may be the prelude to a "hike" right
back to the court, or a "lateral" of the issue into oblivion. Most discipli-
nary agencies follow the lead suggested by ABA Standard for Lawyer
Discipline and Disciplinary Proceedings Rule 8.10, which calls for discipli-
nary proceedings to be stayed when there is pending a civil proceeding
to which the respondent is a party, or a criminal proceeding in which
the respondent is a defendant, if the proceeding involves substantially
the same subject matter as the disciplinary proceeding.2' Given human
nature and the availability of judicial remedies in all cases pending
before a court, most bar counsel, and many ethics committees, stretch
17. Cf. Allegart v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1977).
18. Cf. W.T. Grant v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976).
19. Levy, supra note 10, at 114. But compare Canon 3, section B(3) of the ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct (1972):
A judge should [either] take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures
against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge
may become aware.
20. "You can't unring a bell" goes the cliche. A variation [recently recited at a CLE
program by a former Governor of Kentucky and former federal judge] goes: "It
doesn't do any good to strain the milk once the cow's pee'd in the bucket."
21. Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.180(2) provides:
Proceedings may be deferred by the Tribunal if there is pending civil or
criminal litigation directly involving the Respondent [lawyer] or proposed
Respondent involving substantially similar material allegations to that or
those in the disciplinary proceedings, provided however, that the respon-
dent-attorney proceeds with reasonable dispatch to insure the prompt dis-
position of the pending litigation.
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the policy of restraint embodied in the ABA rule and refuse to become
involved in matters that are "in litigation." 22 This may be a reasonable
position for an ethics committee to take, but given judicial indifference
or timidity when it comes to matters of lawyer discipline, complaints
tend to get lost in a sort of Alphonse and Gaston circuit.23
In short, only a portion of all potential disciplinary cases will be
initiated at, stay in the hands of, or even come to the attention of, the
office of bar (disciplinary) counsel. Some of the work of "educating"
the deviant lawyer may be picked up by the courts. But much more
will be funneled to bar ethics committees, which have become, by ed-
ucation and suasion as well as "advisory opinions." All too frequently
such committees are also expected to serve as a forum for decision.
Parts III through V of this article address the practical consequences of
this funneling and role confusion.
B. The Literature and the Critics of Ethics Committees
Blow, blow thou winter wind,
Thou art not so unkind
As man's ingratitude;...
Freeze, freeze, thou bitter sky,
That dost not bite so nigh
as benefits forgot: .... 24
1. Critics of the Substance of Bar Opinions. - Although there has
been little professional commentary on the work of bar ethics commit-
tees,25 virtually all that has appeared to date includes (a) at least some
22. See discussion at lB1(a) below. Committees prefer not to become involved in
ex parte resolution of actively litigated issues on a one-sided presentation. One solution
might be for a court to request guidance pursuant to Canon 3(A)(4) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct (1972) [Canon 3(B)(7)(b) of the new 1990 Code] which allows the
judge to obtain:
... the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a pro-
ceeding before [the judge] if [the judge] gives notice to the parties of the
person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties
a reasonable opportunity to respond.
23. The allusion is to a cartoon series popular in the 1920s involving two
Frenchmen who could never get anywhere because they were constantly yielding the
right-of-way as in the exchange "After you, Alphonse-No! No! No! After you,
Gaston!"
24. William Shakespeare No. 146 O.B.E.V. (Ed. Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch 1940).
25. The existing literature includes, alphabetically by author: Chanin, The Scope
and Use of State Ethics Opinions, 14 J. LEGAL PROF. 161 (1989); Cheatum & Lewis, Corn-
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criticism of the types of questions that are addressed in committee
opinions as well as (b) complaints regarding the "thoroughness" and
"accuracy" of the opinions surveyed.
a. Questions Addressed.- Professor Wolfram is certainly one of
the more influential commentators in the field of legal ethics, 26 and he
has very little that is good to say about bar association ethics commit-
tees. Indeed the very first sentence in his book dealing with the subject
exudes something like contempt:
At one time relatively significant disciplinary control over lawyers
was exerted by local, state, and national bar associations through
the promulgation of "opinions" by so-called ethics committees.2
After making a point that is difficult to refute-that at times such
opinions (the ABA opinions at least) have tended to be excessively de-
voted to "advertising and solicitation issues" - Professor Wolfram
moves on to denigrate the importance of all ethics opinions by sug-
gesting that academics aren't interested in them, and that courts rarely
cite or rely upon them. 28 Stylistically, such opinions are described as
"dogmatic," and characterized by "strong statement rather than flaw-
less reasoning" as well as verbiage that is unnecessarily "righteous."
Insofar as the substance of bar ethics opinions is concerned, Wolf-
ram finds that their "conclusions are often difficult to reconcile with
other, often uncited opinions or to trace to specific provisions of the
relevant lawyer codes."129 Of course, the same, could be said of many
judicial opinions (and not just judicial opinions dealing with lawyers' eth-
mittees on Legal Ethics, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 28 (1935); Finman & Schneyer, The Role of Bar
Association Ethics Opinions In Regulating Lawyer Conduct, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67 (1981);
Little & Rush, Resolving The Conflict Between Professional Ethics Opinions and Antitrust
Law, 15 CA. L. REV. 341 (1981); RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS
(1988); C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1986).
26. Professor Wolfram is the Principal Reporter for the ALl Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers and the author of Modern Legal Ethics (West 1986).
27. WOLFRAM, supra note 7, at 65 (1986). It is worth noting that Arthur Train had
his cult hero Ephraim Tutt identify one of his scurviest and most unethical (certainly the
most hypocritical) enemies as the chairman of a bar association ethics committee. A.
TRAIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF EPHRAIM TUTT 158-88 (1943). One may well question the
fairness of Train's indirect criticism of contemporary bar committees. See infra note 68.
28. WOLFRAM, supra note 7, at 65-67. For contrary views see Chanin, The Scope
and Use Of State Bar Ethics Opinions, 14 J. LEGAL PROF. 161 (1989) and Finman &
Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A
Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
29 UCLA L REV. 67 (1981).
29. WOLFRAM, supra note 7, at 66.
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ics). After lamenting this problem of inconsistency, Wolfram goes on to
attribute many (perceived) problems of "quality," or at least relevance,
to what some would call jurisdictional problems. Wolfram cites an ABA
rule and ABA opinions, 30 which contain or allude to what Wolfram calls
"structural" limitations on the types of questions that committees are
allowed to field. These limitations are imposed on most, if not all, state
bar ethics committees. For example, a Kentucky Opinion31 provides a
conventional checklist: Supreme Court Rule 3.530(1) provides: [that]
"[a]ny attorney who is in doubt as to the propriety of any professional
act contemplated by him ... may in writing to the Director petition for
an advisory opinion thereon." (Emphasis added). Consistent with this
language, the Committee does not answer questions relating to the
past or anticipated conduct of opposing counsel or other third parties,
or an attorney's own past conduct unless it is tied to his or her future
conduct. [T]he Committee does not answer questions of law. The reso-
lution of disagreements between attorneys, attorneys and clients, and
attorneys and third parties, is not in the Committee's jurisdiction. Simi-
larly, responding to media inquiries regarding pending requests for
opinions would be inconsistent with the language of the Rule and the
proper function of the Committee. Finally, the Committee does not
have jurisdiction to render a legal analysis of the powers of any gov-
ernment official.
Without discussing the possibility that such limitations might have
some sound basis in policy or practicality, Wolfram seems to be sug-
gesting that if past conduct, the conduct of opposing counsel, and
questions of law cannot be the subject of "advisory ethics opinions," 32
then little if anything of real value can be expected to turn up in any
committee opinion.
(b) Quality of Opinions
Professor Wolfram observes that the work product of the ABA
Committee typifies "the best, as well as the worst" of the opinions of
ethics committees.33 Wolfram goes on to state the obvious, and that
which could be said of almost any undertaking- that the quality of
opinions is "uneven, reflecting the talents and interests of volunteer
members." 34 More detailed criticism ofthe ABA work product is pro-
30. Id. (citing ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Prof. Resp., Rules of Proc.,
rules 3 & 4, in 1 ABA Informal Ethics Opinions at 5 (1975)).
31. KBA E-297, ABA/BNA Law. Man. Prof. Con. 801:3912-3913 (1984).
32. WOLFRAM, supra note 7, at 66-67.
33. Id. at 65.
34. Id. at 66.
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vided in an article by Professors Finman and Schneyer. The latter at-
tempts to demonstrate the "striking inadequacy ' ' 33 of the formal opin-
ions of the ABA, and to propose "reforms."
Finman and Schneyer select as a data base only twenty-one ABA
Formal Opinions issued in the first ten years following the adoption of
the ABA Model Code. This extremely limited data base was thought to
"accurately depict" the work of the ABA Committee "as a whole." The
opinions were examined for "merit" and for the "validity of their rea-
soning." 36 This examination revealed that the Committee made forty-
eight "holdings." Only twenty-one of these "holdings" were pro-
nounced "correct," and only seven of these "correct holdings" were
found to have "added" anything to the "obvious meaning of the
Code."137 Seven of the holdings were "clearly wrong." Twenty "hold-
ings" were found to be "based on value choices that are debatable,
i.e., choices which some reasonable lawyers would accept and others
reject." 38 The opinions scored more poorly on "reasoning." Indeed the
Professors contended that the Committee's reasoning was sound only
when the rule applicable to a problem and the meaning of that rule
were obvious." This occurred in only three opinions!39 It is not entirely
clear how significant these "findings" about "holdings" are if one's con-
cern is the practical importance of local and state bar committees and
hotlines.40
A more general, and common, criticism of the substance of bar
committee opinions is that they do not take account of relevant and
frequently controlling "laws of general applicability. ' 41 Once again, the
reader is asked to overlook the jurisdictional or prudential limitations
35. Finman & Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating
Lawyer Conduct, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67, 145 (1981).
36. Id. at 93.
37. Id. at 97.
38. Id. at 102. One might ask if all questions of ethics (and law, for that matter) do
not involve "value choices," and if it is not a characteristic of "value choices" that they
are "debatable." And if an "answer" to an ethics question were not the product of
debateable interpretations and value choices, then how could such an answer be any-
thing but "obvious." One might ask if these academics are not attempting just a little
too hard to sound a little too logical, qualitative, and scientific.
39. Id. at 104.
40. The title of the Finman & Schneyer article suggests that it has something to do
with the subject, and the article has been cited for the proposition that it does shed
some light on the subject.
41. G. HAZARD & S. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING: TEACHER'S MANUAL 13
(1990); Kettlewell, Representing Lawyers (unpublished 1991). See also infra note 59.
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imposed on bar ethics committees-in this instance, that a committee
should try to avoid answering questions of law. Some critics suggest
that bar committees can and should incorporate what would ordinarily
be considered legal analysis and legal advice into "advisory ethics opin-
ions." Other critics suggest that they are not criticizing bar committees
at all, but are simply recommending something more holistic and more
professional (again, the paid consultant).42 The failure or inability of bar
ethics committees to provide such advice is characterized as their prin-
ciple "weakness" and "drawback. '" 4 3
2. The Proceduralists.- The most plaintive critics with a fascina-
tion for things procedural are, once again, Professors Finman and
Schneyer. They attribute much of the weakness of the ABA formal
opinions to (a) the composition or staffing of, and "lack of accountabil-
ity" of, ethics committees, as well as (b) the decision-making proce-
dures employed by them. To be fair to these academics, their com-
plaints and reform proposals seem to be directed almost exclusively to
the ABA Committee [which they refer to as the CEPR]. It is not clear
whether they intend for their "reforms" to be implemented "below"
the ABA level.4 4 It must be acknowledged that by focusing on matters
of form and procedure, they are speaking the language of lawyers and
describing "solutions" that have a superficial appeal. On the other
hand, some of their proposals are a bit whimsical, and would likely
prove to be fiscally profligate if implemented at the state or local level.
(a) Composition and Accountability of Committees.- There have
been complaints about the small size of state bar committees, as well
as complaints that such committees are dominated by particular lawyer
elites (presumably in some states by corporate "big city" types, and in
42. Wolfram rails at the distinction alluded to in committee rules and standing op-
erating procedures against the giving of opinions on the "law," setting up as a straw
man and then knocking down the proposition (attributed to unknown and unnamed,
possibly hypothetical, committee members) that the Code and Rules are not "law."
WOLFRAM, supra note 7, at 67.
43. The message is that if you have a good ethics expert, you should either trade
in that expert for an expert in the "substantive area of law involved" (presumably the
area in which the consultee-lawyer is attempting to practice) or at least hire one of
those too. See HAZARD & KONIAK, supra note 41, at 13. I am not disputing the value of
an additional expert who is familiar with the particular area of practice involved.
44. At least one commentator has interpreted the Finman & Schneyer article as
calling for implementation of more adversarial procedures at the state level as well.
Chanin, The Scope and Use of State Bar Ethics Opinions, 14 J. LEGAL PROF. 161, 170-71
(1989).
1991]
The Journal of the Legal Profession
other states by small town "horse and buggy" types).45 However, no
concrete recommendations have been made as to how these sup-
posed evils might be remedied. 46
It has also been suggested that accountability of committee mem-
bers is lacking, and that greater accountability might result in improved
quality. So it has been argued that opinions should be signed, and that
concurring and dissenting opinions should be filed, suggesting reliance
on a judicial model. The proponents of these "improvements" contend
that this would let "outsider's" know the views of specific members
and enhance the leadership's capacity to use reappointment decisions
for accountability purposes.47
In criticizing the work and work product of the ABA Committee,
Professors Finman and Schneyer count "appellate review" as essential
for "accountability," without explaining what appellate system the ABA
Committee is supposed to hook up with. Many state bar rules already
provide for appellate review of formal committee opinions in order to
provide interested persons an opportunity to object and argue oppos-
ing views, and, oddly enough perhaps, alleviate antitrust concerns.48
Finman and Schneyer concede, in the same paragraph in which they
praise judicial review, that review might be time-consuming, and the
value of'ethics opinions, at least as a guide to the lawyers who request
them, depends on prompt service . . . review might improve the qual-
ity of CEPR opinions and yet impair their value. 49
(b) The Decision-Making Process. -Throughout their article,
Finman and Schneyer treat the work product of ethics committees as a
body of common law.50 They talk of the "precedent" set by ABA opin-
45. The rural-urban hostility is supplemented by a "trial lawyer" -"office lawyer"
enmity. The latter exemplified by the Preface to the American Trial Lawyer's Code of
Conduct:
Lawyers are not licensed to write prospectuses for giant corporations, or
to haggle with federal agencies over regulations and operating rights. We
are licensed to represent people in court ....
Interest group self-glorification, as well as interest group lobbying and the forma-
tion of interest group ethics committees, are all negative developments, perhaps signal-
ing the beginning of the end of the guild (self-regulation, or the proverbial "goose that
laid the golden egg"). See discussion at Part V.
46. FINMAN & SCHNEYER, supra note 24, at 150-56.
47. Id. at 148-49.
48. Little & Rush, Resolving the Conflict Between Professional Ethics Opinions and
Antitrust Laws, 15 GA. L. REV. 341 (1981).
49. FINMAN & SCHNEYER, supra note 24, at 149-50.
50. Id. at 43.
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ions, and they describe something like a "hierarchy" of committees
with the ABA Committee "at the apex." 51 While acknowledging that
this hierarchy is informal, there are suggestions that the whole operates
as something analogous to a judicial system. Having flirted with such an
analogy, it is only natural that these critics insist on the introduction of
"adversarial procedures" into the generation of advisory opinions:
CEPR's [again, shorthand for the ABA on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility] responsibilities are more like a court's than a typical
committee's: both the CEPR and courts must identify and carefully
consider the rules, interpretive problems, precedents, and policies
relevant to their decisions.... In our judgment, many of the [sub-
stantive] flaws in CEPR's opinions could be avoided by making the
Committee's procedures more adversarial, and the procedures
should be structured accordingly.5 2
After several more pages of journal ink the authors inform us that
the introduction of adversarial procedures "would not be difficult":
Two advocates could be appointed to do independent research on
the subject of each prospective opinion and to develop contrary
positions on these subjects. Ideally, the advocates would not be
Committee members and would have special expertise in the pro-
fessional responsibility field . . . [The Committee could also issue] a
general invitation for comments . . .53
In addition to the participation of these knowledgeable and eager-
beaver advocates, the authors allude to "notice-and-comment or hear-
ing procedures"; or as an alternative to dueling advocates, the appoint-
ment of a "single, neutral analyst [staff member and full time em-
ployee]" to provide the committee with "objective memoranda. '5 4
Perhaps it will come as no surprise to the reader that the costs of
the proposed reforms might prove to be significant, if not prohibitive,
even in the limited context of the operation of the ABA Committee.
The authors simply announce that "these modifications in CEPR's pro-
cedures seem both workable and worthwhile" and "feasible. '" 5 5 It is
acknowledged that the employment of a single neutral staff member
providing research and memoranda to the committee "would probably
be less expensive than [the suggested] adversarial reforms," although
51. Id. at 82.
52. Id. at 156-57.
53. Id. at 163.
54. Id. at 166.
55. Id. at 163, 165.
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one guesses that a staff member with skills, talents, and insights
equivalent to those provided by two expert advocates might be ex-
pected to demand some "competitive" level of professional compen-
sation.56 Then, almost as an afterthought, the authors observe that
there will be only a "relatively small number of [formal opinions]" -and
that costs might be minimized by reliance on committee members or
other 'volunteers" [as advocates] rather than "paid experts." 57 Again,
one is forced to consider the possibility that these critics are only talking
about formal opinions published in a bar journal of some sort, and that
they might be satisfied with the work of unpaid volunteers (as serve on
the ABA Committee in its present form) after all.
Aside from considerations of cost, it is clear that the time-delay
associated with the "adversarial process" advanced by these academics
would mean that the end product generated by that process would be
of little use to any lawyer needing a quick answer in a fact specific
situation. Nevertheless, these critics leave us with the comforting
thought that "half a loaf" of their reform bread "may be better than
none"; and as a coup de grace for the ABA Committee - "if no reforms
are instituted . ..the entire system could profitably be abandoned."5 8
3. The Pragmatists. - Not all of the critics recommend the aboli-
tion of bar ethics committees, nor do they waste any time sketching
out elaborate procedural reforms. Instead, they are content to down-
play the practical significance of bar committees and "hotlines" by
pointing out what are perceived to be their inherent limitations.
These pragmatists go beyond the "structural [jurisdictional] limita-
tions" mentioned by other critics.59 Among their best points are the
56. Id. at 166.
57. Id. at 167.
58. Id. at 167. Those of us who pay royalties to the ABA for the right to reprint
the Code or the Rules that we labored to see implemented at the state level, not to
mention ethics opinions that we, ourselves, authored, can see some merit in "aboli-
tion." Cf. Ethics Aren't Always Free; An Intra-ABA Royalty Tussle, THE NAT'L L.J. p. 9 (Apr.
1, 1991) (reporting the problems endured by lawyer Jay Foonberg, who discovered
that his ABA sponsored publication was expected to pay royalties to the ABA
Committee).
59. Charles Kettlewell, who in 1990-91 served as President of the Association of
Professional Liability Lawyers, has written an excellent, but as yet unpublished, set of
guidelines for those who would serve as a professional ethics consultant, under the title
"Representing Lawyers." He observes that in his experience "[bar association commit-
tees] generally will not provide an advisory opinion on a matter that is presently pend-
ing . . . and ... often require a longer period of time [to respond] than the lawyer can
afford."
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following: (a) that there is no attorney-client relationship between an
ethics committee and the lawyer requesting an opinion, and therefore
no attorney-client privilege;60 (b) that the facts related to a committee,
and especially to a "hotline," will be limited or controlled by, and sub-
ject to manipulation by, the requesting lawyer61 -committees can be
taken advantage of; (c) that the proper formulation of opinions takes
an investment in time and research that bar committees and hotlines
will not or cannot commit;6 2 (d) that a bar committee member or "local
expert" may not have sufficient background in the substantive law that
touches on or controls the scenario - the local authority may advise
incorrectly by relying solely on the Code or the Rules (a complaint
mentioned in part IB1(b)); 63 and (e) that since ethics opinions "do not
have the force of law," they are a "legal anomaly" -"ethics opinions
could be more useful if they articulated a norm for general guidance,"
or, if your prefer, general guidelines for routine and recurring situa-
tions.6 4 These criticisms are overblown, but nevertheless are deserving
of some consideration and discussion.
II. A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICS
Here as in life generally the need for plausible hypocrisy serves as a
60. Kettlewell, note 59, at page 2 of 12; Professor Geoffrey Hazard's comments to
the National Association of Bar Counsel, quoted at ABA/BNA Law. Man. Prof. Con. 36
(Vol. 7 No. 2, Feb. 27, 1991).
61. Cf. Kettlewell, note 59, and Hazard, note 60. I have encountered "lying" law-
yers. I am also plagued by lawyers who misrepresent their interest in the course of
requesting opinions. For example, it is not uncommon for a lawyer to represent that he
or she is concerned with his or her own future conduct, when, in fact, the lawyer plans
to use any opinion against some other lawyer [as a condemnation of the other lawyers
conduct]. And during one period in which I was forced to declare a moratorium on
telephone requests for opinions (which were never explicitly authorized by the gov-
erning rule) at least one lawyer represented herself to be my personal physician in
order to get by my secretary.
62. Kettlewell at page 5 of 12. Lawyer Kettlewell contends that a bar association
hotline "would not ...suffice in 90% of the instances [in which he is] retained to
provide advisory opinions. See also Zitrin, Attorney, Heal Thyself, CAL. LAW. 38 (July
1991). The California "hotline" apparently refuses to give advice or opinions, and pro-
vides only references or resource materials. This is a rather luke-warm "hotline" by my
standards. But I'll bet it's well staffed and expensive.
63. GEOFFREY HAZARD & S. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING: TEACHER'S MANUAL
12-13 (1990); Kettlewell at 3, 5.
64. Hazard, as reported at ABA/BNA Law. Man. Prof. Con. 36-37 (Vol. 7 No. 2,
Feb. 27, 1991).
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restraint on misconduct.65
Academics have inspected and "analyzed" ethics committees and
have pronounced them hypocritical and inefficient.66 However, much
of their criticism is founded on misunderstanding; and much more is
grotesque exaggeration. In spite of their inefficiencies and imperfec-
tions, ethics committees provide important services in an increasingly
whimsical6 7 and increasingly hostile "real" world.
A. Substance
The only data that I have access to and that I can vouch for - pro-
vided by questions lawyers have asked me over the last seven
years -convinces me that the questions that are presented to bar asso-
ciation ethics committees are neither "niggling" nor "peripheral." 68 My
committee's records from a sample one-year period reveal that 30-35%
of all requests dealt with conflicts of interest. Another 20% involved
important ethical issues in the context of litigation, dealing with the
merit of claims and contentions, the obligation of candor to the tribu-
nal, client and witness perjury, expediting (or delaying) litigation, discov-
ery obligations, contacting represented and unrepresented persons and
65. Bryden, How to Select a Supreme Court Justice: The Case of Robert Bork, 57
The American Scholar 201, 205 (Spring 1988) (commenting on the Senate's rejection of
Haynsworth and Fortes [for Chief Justice]).
66. A wise old judge for whom I used to work would mutter the same one-liner
when he would encounter any professional critic, or any lawyer or academic who was
loaded up with an excess of gravidas. He would say that such an almighty person
"ought to have to run for County Sheriff." The precise origin of the expression was
never revealed to me, but the sense of it seems to me to be that the person referred
to might benefit from some extremely traumatic and humbling experience . . . prefera-
bly one calling for unsatisfying compromises in the face of harsh realities.
67. The "real world" entertains interjections and objections that are not indexed
in any legal encyclopedia, or dreamt of in any academic's philosophy, e.g.: "I ain't got
to answer that [question] on the grounds of the fifth dimension." (emphasis added, of
course). Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Hays, No. 7983 (Fayette Circuit Court 1970)
(Vol. II). Cf. Eric Jorstad, Litigation Ethics: A Niebuhrian View of the Adversarial Legal
System, 99 YALE L.J. 1089 (1990):
This Note will ...[use] Reinhold Niebuhr's moral realism as a basis to
criticize and reconstruct the conventional approaches to litigation ethics.
The Note will argue that litigation ethics cannot be fully understood except
in the broader context of political philosophy . .. [clonventional legal
ethicists have failed to see that political philosophy is an essential frame-
work in which to understand the study of legal ethics.
68. A table of raw data covering the period July 1984 to July 1985 was published
in RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WILLIAm H. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS, § 20.4.2. (1988).
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problems relating to investigation, lawyer-as-witness problems, and the
mechanics of withdrawal. Only 12% dealt with economic (and presum-
ably "peripheral") questions such as advertising, solicitation, and firm
names and letterheads. These figures are consistent with those pro-
duced in the limited empirical studies that have been done in an effort
to document the ethical problems that practicing lawyers encounter
and report as the most important and the most difficult.69 It is also
worth noting that the same mix of serious questions are found in the
records of state bar ethics committees from the 1920's.70
Continuing with the checklist provided by Professor Wolfram, it
must also be said that academic indifference to the work product of
state bar committees hardly rises to the level of substantial criticism.
Professional ethics and professional etiquette have never been given
center stage in any law school. Furthermore, one of the union rules
among academic lawyers, at least from the 1970's on, has been that no
time should be wasted on mundane, and peculiarly local ("parochial")
matters such as state ethics rules and ethics opinions.71 Without casting
69. See, e.g., Trotter Finn, Ethical Problems in the Legal Profession: The View From
the Inside Out, 14 J. LEGAL PROF. 73 (1989) (survey ranking conflicts of interest as the
most important category for lawyer concern, with 18% of lawyers also citing fee
problems as a major concern). Questions regarding fees accounted for only 3% of the
workload of my ethics committee during the sample one year reporting period.
70. See, e.g., ABA Annotated Canons 165 (1926), which presents extracts from
the Yearbooks of the Chairman of the Comm. on Professional Ethics of the New York
County Lawyer's Association for the years 1925 through 1925 ("Indicating Subjects
Upon Which Inquirers Have Consulted The Chairman, Without Requiring Submission to
the Committee"). These Yearbooks describe what is essentially an informal hotline ser-
vice. Professor Wolfram's historical criticism of ethics committees relies on J. HURST, THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 331 (1950) which observes that half of the
ABA ethics opinions (presumably formal or informal opinions written by the ABA Com-
mittee and published in the ABA Journal) between 1924 and 1936 "dealt simply with
the business aspects of the profession."
71. The teaching of "law" will soon be dominated by extremely eccentric per-
sons. Everything will have to be acknowledged to be "political," and all discourse will
be couched in terms of "economics" (hopelessly simplistic, politically "conservative,"
often goofy economics, but always masquerading as "scientific") and "philosophy"
(mostly "liberal," sometimes Marxist, as philosophy goes almost always yesterday's
newspapers, frequently silly philosophy, but always masquerading as "scientific"). First
rate law schools will be turned into second rate graduate schools; second rate law
schools will be turned into third rate graduate schools; ... and so on. I sometimes feel
that my own institution (usually a pretty quiet place) can degenerate into "The Law
School That Is Run Like The Spanish Civil War"-the Authoritarians on the Right com-
peting with the Authoritarians on the Left, to see who will win the privilege of obliterat-
ing the last safe place for the cello players.
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any stones at Professor Wolfram, whose accomplishments do not need
my endorsement, there are those among us who feel that much of the
academic "work" in "professional ethics" amounts to little more than
pedantry and obscuritism.
While Professor Wolfram states categorically that "[e]thics opinions
continue to be rarely cited and relied upon in judicial decisions, " 72 the
judicial reaction to bar ethics opinions has been very much of a "mixed
bag," ranging from rare instances of outright hostility7 3 to total defer-
ence to committee opinions.74 It seems fair to say that most judges
consider bar opinions to be of some persuasive value. 75 But there is
also at least anecdotal evidence that judges are no more familiar with
the "issues" and "sources" than the average lawyer.76 For these rea-
sons, generalizations should be viewed with some skepticism.
The remaining complaints regarding the quality of state bar ethics
opinions are not really very substantial. Indeed, some are quite trivial.
Judicial opinions are often inconsistent, and frequently fail to account
for all preceding opinions, even within the same judicial circuit. There is
no particular reason to expect the work product of ethics committees
to be any more of a seamless web. Even academics have been known
to be inconsistent, incomplete, and "righteous." Given the limited fund-
ing of bar committees, it is no wonder that their work product is not
art work. Furthermore, I contend (based on some considerable first
hand, real world experience) that ethics committees should serve only a
very limited, yet very important purpose-to provide limited (discipli-
nary) protection of lawyers who come to the committee in good faith
72. WOLFRAM, supra note 7, at 65.
73. Chanin, supra note 24, cites In re Ark. Supreme Court Comm. on Advisory
Ethics Opinions, 272 Ark. 525, 611 S.W.2d 761 (1981), in which the highest court of
that state declared that "[t]he opinions of an ethics committee would ... be of such
slight and inconsequential value as not to justify the imposition of the necessary ex-
penses upon the members of the bar and ultimately upon the public."
74. Judges in my jurisdiction carry deference to the extreme, and even attempt to
refer motions involving ethical issues (motions to disqualify counsel or exclude evi-
dence) to the committee for decision.
75. See Chanin, supra note 24, at 166. But cf. In re Himmel, 125 111. 2d 531, 533
N.E.2d 790 (1988), in which the Illinois high court ignored the views of the Illinois
committee.
76. Cf. John M. Levy, The Judge's Role in the Enforcement of Ethics-Fear and
Learning in the Profession, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95 (1982). In order to stimulate judicial
interest and judicial education in the Code and Model Rules the ABA Standing Commit-
tee on Professional Discipline published The Judicial Response To Lawyer Misconduct
(ABA 1984).
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for the purpose of obtaining practical answers to difficult questions on
an expedited basis. Consistency, elegance of expression, and footnote
form are not really necessary (although I would be the last to say that
such frills are undesirable). Even in formal published opinions, they are
of secondary importance.
Finally, something must be said in favor of the prudential limitations
placed upon the types of questions ethics committees will address.
While procedures may, in fact, impact on quality, that will be the sub-
ject of the next section.
The "jurisdictional" or prudential rules imposed on committees are
much misunderstood and are a common subject of complaint from
practicing lawyers as well as academic commentators. In practice, none
of these limitations is iron-clad. Some of the constraints are more "for-
mal" than others, but each serves a useful purpose.
It should be apparent that there is no way a committee can pro-
vide guidance that will protect a lawyer from discipline for conduct that
has already occurred. Hence the suggestion that committees do not
answer questions regarding "past conduct." Such an opinion would not
be advisory at all. Furthermore, it is desirable that committees not be-
come directly involved as players in the disciplinary process. While this
point is discussed in more detail in a later section of this article, 7 the
integrity of the ethics committee will be compromised, and the willing-
ness of lawyers to consult it will decline, if it cannot keep an arms
length away from the disciplinary system. Also, the opportunities and
incentive to manipulate committees by distortion of fact are much
greater in this context. Of course, there must be some flexibility, and
committees frequently give opinions on past conduct if it is tied to an-
ticipated (future) conduct (as in, "Where do I go from here?").
Other limitations are designed to discourage misuse and abuse of a
committee's services. In order to fully understand these limitations, one
must remember that ethics committees are neither equipped for nor
are they expected to hold hearings or take evidence. They are to re-
spond to an ex parte presentation of the "facts" by a requestor con-
cerning the requestor's own contemplated (future) conduct. At the
same time, resort to ethics committees can be encouraged only if some
degree of confidentiality is accorded, at least at the outset.
These considerations account in large part for the rule against the
generation of opinions about the conduct of other (non-requestor) law-
yers, the reluctance of committees to provide information to nonre-
77. See Part I.E.
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questing lawyers, clients and the press, and rules cautioning against in-
volvement in matters that have already been presented, or are about
to be presented, to the court (matters "in litigation"). An elimination of
these prudential rules would invite offensive, and not defensive, use of
opinions, and would encourage lawyers to seek and exploit the "defini-
tive views" of the bar for tactical purposes. When matters involve an-
other lawyer, or a matter pending before a court, there are other ways
for ethics committees or other organs of the bar to "participate" that
will provide notice to all parties, and an opportunity for them to be
heard. 78
Many examples of misuse and abuse of ethics committees are pro-
vided in Parts IV and V of this article, along with a discussion of the
pitfalls inherent in answering "questions of law." At this point it is suffi-
cient to note that lawyers can and do seek free legal research, and ask
elaborate questions relating to the practical and tactical aspects of han-
dling particular cases. The reluctance of committees to answer such
questions does not flow from any misunderstanding over the "legal"
status of the Code or Rules. Instead, the admittedly fuzzy distinction
between legal questions and ethical questions (usually there are reason-
ably clear and fair distinctions to be drawn) provides committee mem-
bers with a way to decline to serve as uncompensated law clerks,
judges, and assistant attorneys general.
Finally, ethics committees are, or at least should be, participatory
and democratic. These are values that ought to be weighed in the bal-
ance, along with the other "realities" that may impact on "quality" as
the critics define quality. This returns us to the subject of procedure.
B. Procedure
Consider, for a moment, the problems of democracy. On the one
hand, the increasing fragmentation of and specialization within the bar
calls for some democratic process, or hint of representative govern-
ment, at least at the Board of Governors level. 79 When a question is
sufficiently important and recurring to justify the publication of a formal
opinion (the type of published work product that the critics, have
homed in on) the ethics committee chairman will usually seek input
from the full committee and the Board, and rightly so. These are rules
that govern lawyers; and they are rules that are based, in large part, on
traditions which may not be intuitively obvious. Some degree of pro-
78. See discussion of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in part L.A.
79. Compare comments at note 45, supra.
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fessional consensus is desirable, even if consensus does not yield a
"perfect" answer.
On the other hand, opinion writing at the Board of Governors
level can lead to the sort of "imprecision" and "righteousness"8 that
so offends the academic critics of ethics committees. Board members
tend to be drawn from the middle-aged and the successful. It is a well
known fact that successful lawyers tend to hold opinions that are suffi-
ciently strong to forestall curiosity in the actual text of the Code and
Rules, let alone curiosity in case law and like esoterica. Committee
draftspersons and their "research" are apt to receive the same short
shrift given to servile associates in very large law firms and other crea-
tures down the evolutionary ladder. As an academic lawyer, I am fre-
quently thanked for my scholarship and dismissed with contrary instruc-
tions, sometimes without a hint of any coherent rationale to support
the Board's ultimate position on a matter. There are times when it is
difficult for the professional player (the ethics expert or academic) to
give democracy its due, and resist the political players, who would re-
duce his or her role to that of scrivener or clerk.81 Along the same
lines, some questions invite a division along practice lines.82 Indeed,
there have been times when I have determined that the submission of
a question to "the higher authority" was best delayed or avoided
altogether.
The fragmentation and specialization of the bar has other "quality"
implications. Just as it is true that "among barbarians, all are slaves save
one,"' 83 it is also a fact that among academics (again, the critics of bar
opinions are, for the most part, academics) all are constitutional law
teachers save a couple of us who teach insurance law.8 4 I must bow in
80. See Wolfram 's criticisms in part IB.l.a.
81. In this regard, Geoffrey Hazard, the ABA Reporter has been subjected to a
great deal of unfair, indeed petty, criticism. The Model Rules were the product of a
legislative process, with all that entails. His critics can write all of the codes they
want-the trick is to get someone to adopt them.
82. Should a defense lawyer be permitted to talk to a plaintiff's treating physician
without notice to the plaintiff's lawyer? Should a defense lawyer in a civil rights class
action be permitted to make a settlement offer contingent on a waiyer of statutory
attorney fees? Should relevant evidence be excluded because a prosecutor talked to a
suspect that he knew might already be represented by a lawyer? Lawyers do not
choose up sides on such questions without regard to the "bottom line."
83. Euripides.
84. For an accurate assessment of the curriculum see James D. Gordon, Ill, How
Not To Succeed In Law School, 100 YALE L.J. 1679, 1683-84 (1991) ("... A good law
school's curriculum is not tied to the law of any particular state ... [and an] 'elite' law
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the direction of the critics to the extent of conceding that it is difficult
for a generalist or an academic, or even a specialist, to answer ques-
tions arising in the context of unfamiliar specialty areas of practice. On
the other hand, this problem will not be remedied by a "call" for com-
ments, or a standing invitation for comments set forth in a rule. Partici-
pation is not so easy to come by. Nor does the answer lie in profes-
sional demographics- quota-like selection of Committee and Board
members to guarantee appropriate measures of "input" and "insight."
Most people are more willing to criticize than they are willing to invest
any effort in a solution. Furthermore, intraprofessional class struggle is
moving from rhetoric to reality.85
There have been numerous occasions on which "my" Board has
invited input and argument from interested parties in the hope of se-
curing enlightenment.86 Unfortunately, to ask is not to receive, even
from persons who claim an interest. The "aggrieved" all too often pre-
fer to lie in wait. When "affected" or otherwise interested parties do
participate, the level of input and argument they provide tends to be
disappointing. Such "briefs" as are submitted seldom stoop to the cita-
tion of any authority. The debate that follows such submissions usually
wanders far afield into war stories, or degenerates into the inevitable
argument between the plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers on the Board
and the insurance defense lawyers on the Board about the adequacy of
the substantive law or a particular rule of procedure (especially when
the ethics question relates to real estate or ERISA practice) or the moral
bankruptcy of one or the other of the contending viewpoints. There is
a lot of truth that "[a] camel is a horse that was made by a committee."
school's ... curriculum is not tied to the law of any particular planet.").
85. Again, compare The American Trial Lawyer's Code of Conduct (Revised Draft
1982), Preface:
It [referring to the ABA Model Rules] is the sort of thinking you get from a
commission made up of lawyers who work for institutional clients, in insti-
tutional firms, and who have lost sight of the lawyer's basic function ....
86. The sort of occasions that come to mind involved questions relating to title
insurance and the relevance of RESPA, the proper disclosures to be made when filling
out HUD forms, and other esoteric matters. See part IV.E. It is very difficult-to get input
from "experts" and "specialists." The Virginia State Bar apparently permits non-reques-
tors to request "reconsideration" of opinions, and also provides for circulation of opin-
ions to specialized "sections" of the bar association. See ABA/BNA Law. Man. Prof.
Con. 37 (Vol. 7, No. 2, Feb. 27, 1991). The New York State Bar Association is to be
commended for its effort to publish materials on legal ethics in the context of specialty
practice. In particular I refer to ETHICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASE STUDIES, a publication
of the NYSBA's Environmental Law Section.
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As far as the need for accountability is concerned, I suspect that
few lawyers would consider a slot on a volunteer ethics committee to
be a professional plum providing sufficient compensation for torment at
the hands of critics and overseers, academic or otherwise. I consider
wildly implausible the prediction that signed opinions, academic or
democratic (popular) "review," and the threat of replacement for un-
satisfactory performance, would have any impact on the quality of bar
ethics opinions. Furthermore, a proliferation of signed majority, concur-
ring, and dissenting opinions is not needed. 87 The 40 page, heavily
footnoted, law clerk generated, Supreme Court opinion is a poor
model, at least in this context.
C. Pragmatic Considerations
I have labeled as "pragmatists" those critics who focus on confi-
dentiality, the problem of manipulation, the problem of limited re-
sources, and the difficulty of giving "ethics advice" to lawyers in spe-
cialty areas of practice. I will spend little time trying to dismiss or refute
their criticisms. I simply disagree with their bottom line-that ethics
committees are necessarily second rate, or that ethics committees
should be abolished, shunned or prevented from issuing anything other
than general "guidelines."
Confidentiality is a problem. Lawyers are generally enjoined from
discussing information relating to the representation of their clients, and
are naturally reluctant to discuss matters that may be embarrassing to
themselves and others, particularly with "the [E]stablishment." 88 Indeed,
it has been my experience that lawyers naturally drift into a vague and
hypothetical style, even when assured of confidentiality. In the absence
of a statutory or rule based privilege, one must rely upon the discretion
of committee members8" who must argue something akin to an attor-
ney-client relationship. This is not ideal for two reasons. First of all, to-
day's judges seem to have a limited appreciation of professional eti-
. 87. The terse opinions of the Virginia Committee may be the best model. See VA.
STATE BAR PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK (Michie) (published annually).
88. See Ethics Consulting Takes Root as an Important Legal Field, THE BAR LEADER
(May-June 1990, at 6, 7) (quoting John Berry, staff counsel of the Florida Bar and Presi-
dent of the National Organization of Bar Counsel).
89. I boldly claim that my discussions are privileged, and I suspect that the claim
would be upheld, mainly because no one else wants my "job." Keith Kaap, an "ethics
advisor" for the Wisconsin State Bar, also claims a privilege, and reports that in twelve
years of giving advice, he has encountered only one (unsuccessful) challenge. ABA/BNA
Law. Man. Prof. Con. 37 (Vol. 7, No. 2, Feb. 27, 1991).
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quette and professional solidarity, and tend to give matters of privilege
short shrift.90 Secondly, recognition of an attorney-client privilege will
invite overreaching in the form of claims of reliance on advice of coun-
sel [the committee] that go beyond the intent of the governing commit-
tee rules.9 1 On the other hand, it seems to me that these problems can
be solved by an explicit legislative recognition of a privilege, coupled
with a disclaimer of any attorney-client relationship.9 2
Ethics Committees can be manipulated. Indeed, the language of
most "bar rules" admits as much.93 Clearly, the ex parte nature of the
process, and confidentiality, invite abuse and manipulation; and a com-
mitment to a "hotline" approach to problems of legal ethics exacer-
bates the problem.94 However, serious problems of abuse can be mini-
mized if committees will adhere to their "jurisdictional" rules, and if the
bar and the courts will recognize the limited, albeit important, role of
the advisory opinion. Paid ethics consultants are manipulated too,9 and
are also vulnerable to charges of "interest." About the only thing
unique about manipulation of ethics committees is that they must serve
all comers. Work can be forced upon them, and they can be worked
by "both sides" at the same time. It is not uncommon for me to get
calls from lawyers on opposite sides of a running vendetta-and not
realize [or be informed of] the fact!
Finally, it is apparent that problems flowing from insufficient re-
sources or expertise in a particular area of law are not, in fact,
90. There have been several instances in which I have given what I considered
well supported and "conventional" opinions to lawyers urging them to maintain confi-
dentiality, or at least assert the privilege, in the context of requests for information
regarding clients (including fugitive clients), in the classic sentencing scenario, and in the
context of enumerating grounds for withdrawal. See RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM
H. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS §§ 14.5, 18.5.1, and 18.5.2 (1988). I have learned that some
judges have rather unorthodox views on these matters. Furthermore, it would appear
that "judging" can blunt the sensibilities. A protective opinion from the bar association
will not assure that a lawyer will not be "excoriated" (or worse).
91. See discussion in text at note 33.
92. Id.
93. Such opinions only protect a lawyer from discipline, and then only if the law-
yer has made a good faith effort to give a truthful and complete characterization of the
circumstances of the requested opinion. See note 172.
94. In my experience, the "facts" can be a moving target, and I generally insist on
either restating my understanding of the facts in my letter opinions, or insisting that the
requestor provide a written version of his or her question so that the "facts" can be
documented.
95. Compare the discussion of the "OPM Leasing Services, Inc." case in P. HEY-
MANN & L. LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 184-197 (1988).
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problems peculiar to ethics committees. Furthermore, there many situa-
tions in which it is simply unreasonable for lawyers to expect bar com-
mittees to "bail them out."
II1. THE PROPER ROLE OF AN ETHICS COMMITTEE
You better stop, look around,
Here it comes, here comes your
nineteenth nervous breakdown.96
If there is one point to be made in responding to critics of ethics
committees, or in advising bar associations, members of ethics commit-
tees, and consumers of advisory opinions, it is that complex advocacy
models complete with "the usual" appellate review are fiscally profli-
gate and delay creating, and may defeat the very purpose of having
bar sponsored committees and "hotlines." As a prime corollary, I
would suggest that a cult of precedent and a methodology of priestly
casuistry are likewise undesirable. The ethics rules can and should be
applied as rules of reason.97 Their application is fact-sensitive. To the
extent that resources and prudential considerations permit, answers
should be direct and timely, even if that means, on occasion, that the
"answers" appear inelegant, inconsistent, or even "wrong."
I do not wish to denigrate the value of well researched and per-
suasively written formal opinions and general guidelines. Nevertheless,
what lawyers want and need most is a disinterested and knowledgea-
ble sounding board that can provide a quick "yes" or "no" to the easy
questions, and plausible, protective guidance in the really hard cases in
which there is not, in fact, any definitive answer, and insufficient time
for the discovery of a political consensus.
Perhaps I am willing to accept "wrong" answers asked for and
given in good faith simply because I know that "right answers" are
elusive.98 It is not clear to me that resources should be expended disci-
96. Nineteenth Nervous Breakdown, Mick Jagger and Keith Richards c 1966 ABKO
Music, Inc.
97. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Scope [1].
98. Should a lawyer be disciplined for failing to disclose the death of his personal
injury client [in the absence of deliberate violation of a procedural rule of the fo-
rum- e.g., a rule requiring timely substitution of parties]? Virzi v. Grand Trunk Ware-
house and Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich 1983) suggests that the an-
swer is obvious-that it must be "Yes." But it might interest the reader to know that
the Virginia State Bar Committee has suggested the contrary in a persuasive, process
oriented, opinion. See Va. Op. 952 (1987). Furthermore, I suggest that it is difficult to
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plining lawyers when the "answers" are debatable and when no bene-
fit is being conferred on the lawyer's client. Indeed, I would suggest
that a winning defense in many disciplinary cases would be that disci-
pline in the particular case would offend due process, much in the
same way that common law crimes offended our ancestors' sense of
due process. 9 In any event, the principle value of bar association ethics
committees lies in their ability to keep the "honest" practitioner on
track, and keep him or her from making stupid mistakes or having un-
necessary "nervous breakdowns." Committees can also provide some
"ethics" education through formal opinions, assuming that lawyers will
read them, but that role may be "secondary."
Indeed, the importance of protective "informal" opinions is
demonstrated by the fact that the formal opinions targeted by the
"critics" amount to a very small percentage of the "output" of bar
association ethics committees.'0
IV. IMPROPER ROLES: MISUSE OF ETHICS COMMITTEES
I didn't think I'd be allowed to handle it, but I agreed to send
a letter to the Ethics Committee. I'd figured I'd tell them the facts
and leave it up to them."
"That's hopeless," Ashley said. "If you have a serious ethical ques-
tion, they never give you an answer in time." 10 1
This scenario points up the need for an "ethics hotline," if qualified
and meaningful advice is to be provided "on tap." On the other hand,
in Wishman's scenario, and all too frequently in the "real world," the
lawyer involved in the discussion concedes that he thinks he knows the
correct answer and is only using the committee for "client relations"
purposes. Committees and other intermediaries are frequently used as
square Virzi with the constricted definition of fraud contained in the definitions of the
Model Rules, or with Model Rule 4.1(b) and the Comments thereto. It is not that I
disagree with the approach set forth in Virzi. Timely disclosures, even of adverse fact,
may be in the client's best interests in at least some contexts. I simply insist that there
are more judgment calls out there than many "experts" acknowledge.
99. Cf. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968); In re A. 554 P.2d 479 (Or. 1976). My
other suggestions for defending disciplinary cases are (1) be humble and (2) get some-
one else to do the lawyering for you.
100. See ABA/BNA Law. Man. Prof. Con. 37 (Vol. 7, No. 2, Feb. 27, 1991) (report-
ing that of 2,500 to 3,000 calls a year to the Virginia State Bar ethics counsel, only 200
to 250 requests are for traditional formal opinions, and of that small number 90 to 100
can be disposed of by reference to existing formal opinions).
101. SEYMOUR WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER 191 (1981).
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a "lightning rod" to draw fire coming from clients, or to provide the
necessary and authoritative "no" answer that the lawyer would rather
not give to the client direct. 10 2
But the Wishman excerpt also exposes another overlooked and
undesirable "side-effect" of bar association furnished, "on call," ethics
advice, and committee willingness to be "helpful." Specifically, a signifi-
cant number of lawyers who otherwise might struggle with the Code
or Rules10 3 will begin to rely on committee letter opinions as a crutch,
and ultimately, a justification for overlooking conflicts and other ethical
problems. The lawyer will simply take on any case, no matter how
"smelly" the circumstances,104 send in a request in the hope of being
"covered," and ignore the problem until "the Ethics Committee inter-
venes." 10 5 In other words, in a rather cynical fashion, these "frequent
102. Chanin, supra note 24 at 167-68 points out that an advisory opinion might
help a lawyer "when circumstances require that [the lawyer] take certain actions which
are adverse to the interests of [the] client (what should the lawyer do with the fruits or
instrumentalities of a crime that he or she has inadvertently taken possession of) or
(when the lawyer is asked to) enter into an agreement which the client desires or de-
mands (involving advancement of living expenses, particular disbursements of client
funds, etc.)." Committee opinions may also be sought to break deadlocks that cannot
be resolyed in law firm "conflicts" or "new business" committees.
103. It is frequently assumed that the "lawyers who take the time and concern to
make an ethics inquiry are not the ones with whom bar counsel will likely ever be
concerned." ABA/BNA Law. Man. Prof. Con. 36 (Feb. 27, 1991). See also Rule 1.7
Comments ("The lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures . . . to determine
whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest .... Resolving questions of
conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking
representation.").
104. My committee members frequently opine that scenarios do not pass their
"nose test" or "smell test." The classicists on my committee have Roman noses, and
resort to application of the "Rule of Caesars's Wife" (Thou shalt not suffer an appear-
ance of impropriety). That rule has remarkable staying power. See First Am. Carriers,
Inc. v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d 669 (Ark. 1990).
105. In Wishman's book a rather sleazy assistant prosecutor obtained the convic-
tion of a dirty cop (in part by resorting to outrageous trial tactics and improper jury
argument). The prosecutor then left the prosecutor's office and entered private prac-
tice. The dirty cop then asked the former prosecutor to handle the criminal appeal as
well as the cop's civil service appeal of the loss of his pension benefits resulting from
his conviction. Regarding the civil case the former prosecutor explained to his lawyer
cronies (including Wishman):
... I didn't think I'd be allowed to handle it, but I agreed to send a letter
to the ethics committee. I figured I'd tell them the facts and leave it up to
them.
By the time the ethics committee published an opinion in the bar journal saying essen-
tially "What kind of a lawyer would even ask such a question?" the criminal case had
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fliers" use ethics committees as a means of avoiding the exercise of
professional judgment. They evade their professional responsibility. This
phenomenon may account for the fact that between 10% and (lately)
20% of all the requests for opinions that come to my committee in-
volve straightforward applications of Rule 1.9 (former client or "closed
file" conflicts). Lawyers simply cannot be confused about the rule to be
applied in such cases. The issues raised by these repetitive requests are
factual. The requestor lawyers do not want to turn away any work if
the decision can be delayed, avoided all together, or passed off onto
someone else. In such instances, ethics committees are not being asked
for opinions, guidance, or advice, as much as they are being asked to
make decisions that the requestor-lawyer should be making. 106 One
suspects that in many instances the requestor lawyer does not antici-
pate or even want a timely reply, but simply wants to delay the day of
reckoning in the hope of persuading a court or (in the worst case sce-
nario) a disciplinary tribunal that some "hardship" exception should ap-
ply, or that the situation is, after all, "all the fault of the Ethics
Committee."
When this kind of ethical "buck passing" becomes commonplace,
the ethics committee is being "misused" in the sense that it is being
forced to play a role that it should not have to play. But there are still
other ways in which committees are asked to perform improper roles
which are not at all obvious to lawyers, or to all bar officials, or even to
all committee members.
A. Lawmaking
1. Deciding Questions of Law.-Contrary to the claims of the
critics,10 7 ethics committee members are fully aware of the "legal" sta-
tus of the Code or Rules, as well as the increasing "legalization" of
"ethics" through court rules, the common law, statutes, and administra-
tive regulations.10 8 The prudential limitation that committees "will not
issue opinions on questions of law" is not technical "lawyer stuff," but
been reversed because of the prosecutor's "inflammatory and overreaching . . .
summation."
"So you not only got the guy's conviction, but his acquittal and pen-
sion too," Ashley said.
"Terrific!" I said. "Some lawyer!"
106. See supra note 103. For the somewhat different problem of the lawyer who
is not asking for advice, but who is insisting on approval, see discussion in part IV.
107. WOLFRAM, supra note 7, at 67.
108. Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1249-60, 1279 (1991).
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more in the nature of garlic nailed on the door to keep away the vam-
pires. It provides an "excuse" allowing committee members to drive off
lawyer-looters who would turn them into law clerks, free lawyers for
lawyers, judges, and assistant attorneys general. The "no law" gimmick
is also a useful emergency brake. It provides a hook for reining in
overly enthusiastic committee members. Bright lawyers are more often
than not opinionated lawyers; and the need of bright and opinionated
lawyers to "edify the bench and bar" can get out of control. At the risk
of being branded a hopeless reactionary, let me provide a few exam-
ples that illustrate how committee members subtly "hold court."
One of the most interesting examples is provided by bar opinions
dealing with settlement offers tendered by defense counsel in civil
rights cases, conditioning settlement on a waiver of statutory attorney
fees. When the question of the propriety of such offers is viewed
solely from the standpoint of the Model Code or Model Rules, it is
difficult to see why they should be deemed unethical. While such an
offer may introduce a degree of conflict between the interests of the
plaintiff (or the plaintiff class if the case is a class action) and the plain-
tiff's counsel, there is no ethics rule to the effect that defense counsel
must sacrifice his or her client's interests, or provide that client with less
than zealous advocacy, to spare the plaintiff's lawyer discomfort. 109
This is just the sort of ethics question that leads to a choosing up of
sides along practice lines, without regard to the language of the ethics
rules. 1 0 Many state bar associations issued opinions declaring that if a
defense lawyer served as a conduit for such an offer, then that lawyer
would commit a disciplinary violation for "creating a conflict" and,
more importantly, for frustrating the "statutory purpose of the civil
rights laws.""' One detects a strong odor or partisanship here, but my
immediate point is that committees holding forth in such fashion are
opining on their perception of the law in order to get a result that they
like, for one reason or another. The ethics committee is the forum, but
the "decision" of the committee is an ethics opinion in name only. Of
course, many committees promptly changed course 1' 2 following the
109. See discussion in Kentucky Op. E-330 (1988).
110. See supra discussion at note 80.
111. See, e.g., DC Op. 147 (1985); N.Y. City Op. 80-94 (1980); N.Y. City Op. 82-
80 (1982). These opinions attempt to tie the perceived "misconduct" to the Code by
suggesting that if such offers offend the "statutory purpose" then they also amount to
conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice" (citing DR 1-102(A)(5)).
112. DC Op. 207 (1989); N.Y. City Op. 1987-4 (1987).
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Supreme Court's opinion in Evans v. Jeff,113 which undermined the ra-
tionale of their opinions. But my point is not that the committee opin-
ions were "wrong" in their interpretation of the law or legislative pol-
icy. My point is.that the committee could have answered the "ethics"
question, and left the legal question for the courts; and they could have
left the matter of backup fee arrangements to the attorney and client
or client class.
Another example of law-making may be identified in the opinions
of bar committees that have addressed the propriety of "attorney sub-
poena" by prosecutors. Again, I risk ostracism in saying this, but it
seems to me that it is one thing for an ethics committee to advise a
defense lawyer as to his or her options upon receipt of a subpoena. 114
It is another for the committee to provide an opinion commenting on
the motives behind or the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct" 5 or
on the desirability or legality of such subpoenas as a general matter.116 I
refer the reader back to the conventional, if much-maligned, checklist
of "jurisdictional" rules.
Instances in which ethics committees have openly strayed into
constitutional adjudication are less common, but they are not hard to
find.117 Opportunities for such "adjudication" arise most frequently in
connection with questions of advertising, prepaid legal services, lawyer
referral, and the like.'1 8 This problem leads us to and overlaps with the
following discussion of bar association rule making.
2. Making and Amending Bar Rules. - Most bar associations have
a Rules Committee, which is "empowered" to review proposals for
changes in the rules governing professional conduct, advertising, group
legal services, lawyer-referral services, bar admission, practice by out-
of-state lawyers, and the like. Furthermore, every state has one or
more committees that consider proposed changes to the civil, criminal,
and appellate rules. Ordinarily such committees report to the high court
113. 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
114. See Kentucky Op. 315 (1987).
115. See infra note 181.
116. Cf. Virginia Op. 846 (undated). See infra note 181.
117. See, e.g., Kentucky Op. E-277 (1984), in which the committee opined that the
Code did not prohibit lawyer contributions to the campaign coffers of judicial candi-
dates. The committee opined that a state statute prohibiting the practice was unconsti-
tutional. Here the committee's intrusion into the law was innocent, and probably
unavoidable.
118. See, e.g., Kentucky Ops. E-344 and E-346 (1991) (discussing efforts by pro-
moters of referral services and pre-paid legal services plans to submit constitutional
questions to the committee).
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of the state, which serves as the ultimate "legislative" body in the con-
text of professional regulation and the regulation of the judicial system.
For reasons that are not apparent to me, lawyers seem to turn to
their Ethics Committees rather than to their Rules Committees. It may
be that the Ethics Committee is the only "familiar" committee (I suspect
that the rules governing the organization and operation of the bar are
consulted infrequently, if at all). Lawyers are- also understandably con-
fused as to whether a question is one of legal ethics or procedural
law. 119 I also suspect that there have been occasions when lawyers
have attempted to slip decidedly minority or partisan views onto the
books by way of advisory opinions. 120 The Ethics Committee should
steer proponents of such legislation to the proper forum.
B. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
When requesting lawyers to learn that they cannot obtain opinions
about their opponents' conduct' 2 1 they are prone to shift gears and ask
the committee or committee chairman to accept "arguments" from
both sides, or to serve as a mediator or arbitrator in some other fash-
ion. Laymen and expert witnesses also attempt to obtain mediation ser-
vices from ethics committees. An expert witness (usually a physician)
who has not been paid may seek an opinion to use as "leverage," or
may expect the committee to serve as a "go-between" to effect a
favorable settlement of a dispute. Lawyers most often call for commit-
tee "mediation" in the hope of persuading a present or former client of
the absence or insignificance of a conflict of interest, or for an informal
and "friendly" forum in which to resolve a dispute over who "owns" a
client or a client's file.1 22 As one might expect, firm break-ups are a
fruitful source of requests for mediation services. 23
A number of state bar associations have initiated ADR programs to
handle disputes arising from firm break-ups and disputes over division
119. See, e.g., Kentucky Op. E-304 (1985) (propriety of ex parte subpoena is first
and foremost a question of procedural law, although such a subpoena is suspect if it
violates the procedural rules or is known to be contrary to accepted practice in the
forum); see also Georgia Op. 40 (1984).
120. See discussion of advisory opinions (or more properly "advocacy opinions")
issued by "specialty" bar associations, in part VII.
121. See discussion at part IBl(a).
122. The attitude that clients are property has been given a boost by recent
amendments to the ABA Model Rules. See Model Rule 1.17.
123. See Chanin, supra note 24, at 168. The 80's generation has provided the grist
for an entire book on law firm breakups. ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAW FIRM BREAKUPS (1990).
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of fees. Credit for the first such program has been claimed by the
Pennsylvania Bar Association. 124 The Kentucky Rules have for some
time provided for legal negligence arbitration and legal fee arbitra-
tion,125 and a proposed rule "establish[ing] a procedure whereby dis-
putes arising among attorneys from their professional and economic re-
lationships may be resolved by submission to mediation, binding
arbitration, or non-binding arbitration" is before the membership for
adoption. 126
Ethics committees simply do not have the resources to serve as
centers for alternative dispute resolution, and in the absence of ena-
bling legislation and adequate staffing committee members should re-
ject ADR initiatives. In many instances disputes will have ripened to the
point they are no longer "mediable" when they are "offered" to the
committee, and the fallout from unsuccessful efforts to "officiate" can
undermine confidence in, and destroy any goodwill earned by, the
well-meaning committee. 127
C. Fee Disputes
Many disciplinary committees routinely and cheerfully reject com-
plaints about fees. Moreover, judges are notoriously insensitive to con-
sumer complaints about fees, and are more than willing to serve as
collection agents for their professional kith and kin. This leaves a lot of
people disillusioned and angry. They come to the ethics committee ex-
pecting relief, because they assume that it has something to do with
lawyer discipline. Lawyers and judges compound the confusion be-
cause they regularly funnel (pass off) complaints to ethics committees,
knowing that such committees have no authority to act in the matters
so referred. Ethics committees are simply used as convenient
124. ABA/BNA Law. Man. Prof. Con. 328, Vol. 5 No. 19 (Oct. 11, 1989).
125. Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.800 (Legal negligence arbitration); Kentucky
Supreme Court Rule 3.810 (Legal fee arbitration).
126. Proposed Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.815 (Untitled) can be found in 55
Kentucky Bench and Bar, No. 2, Spring 1991. One of the principle weaknesses of the
proposed rule is that it requires that such services be provided to lawyers free of
charge. This means that the membership at large must pay for the cost of such ser-
vices, and the usual suspects will have to be rounded up as volunteers. The Pennsylva-
nia plan contemplates that there will be at least some charge to the individual lawyers
benefiting from the services.
127. Something like this frequently happens when law firms attempt to keep two
clients whose interests conflict by offering the firm's good offices for "mediation"
under Model Rule 2.2. The usual result will be that the mediation will break down, and
the firm will end up losing both (unhappy) clients anyway.
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"dumpsters."
Many state bar associations have attempted to provide a sane al-
ternative to litigation of fee disputes (which, after all; invite malpractice
claims as well as disciplinary gridlock). 128 Furthermore, the Comments
to Model Rule 1.5 (which most states have adopted) provide that a
"lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to ...any proce-
dure that has been established for the resolution of fee disputes, such
as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the bar." Ironi-
cally, more often than not, it is the lawyer who refuses to arbitrate or
mediate, and the lawyer who insists on forcing such matters into the
courts or the disciplinary arena.
Until lawyers are persuaded or forced to accept arbitration of fee
disputes, and until judges show that they are willing to take disciplinary
action or otherwise exercise some kind of supervisory authority over
the lawyers that practice before them, or at least refer fee complaints
for mediation or arbitration under bar rules, we cannot hope for im-
proved "public relations." In any event, there is no reason for an ethics
committee to take up this burden.
D. Advertising
"Honest Abe" advertised in the newspaper, and turn of the cen-
tury lawyers' codes permitted "[N]ewspaper advertisements, [and] cir-
culars . . . tendering professional services to the general public."',29 But
some time around 1969 someone decided to ban advertising all to-
gether and drew the proverbial "line in the sand" in the Code. The
credibility of the organized bar and the future of self-regulation were
put at risk, if not squandered, in a battle over economics. The fight
goes on, as the bar seems to be divided into three large camps. At one
extreme are those who cling to the hope of a return to a pre-Bates,
prohibitionist, era. 130 The other extreme is comprised of those who
128. See, e.g., KY. SUPT. CT. R. 3.810 (Legal Fee Arbitration).
129. CODE OF LEGAL ETHICS ADOPTED BY THE KENTUCKY STATE BAR ASS'N (1903), reprinted
in RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS (Supp. 1990). The code did
suggest that such advertisements "are to be dealt in sparingly."
130. There are still many "powerful" people in my neck of the woods who would
prefer that lawyers practice in that atmosphere of discreet anonymity epitomized by
Frobisher & Haslit, the firm of solicitors profiled in A.E.W. Mason's THE HOUSE OF THE
ARROW (1920). The following excerpt from that work (which is also reported in F.AR.
BENNION, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1969)) relates the reaction of a senior partner of that august
establishment when a "newcomer" suggested that "there ought to be a brass plate
upon the door":
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would like to lobby through an "ethics rule" allowing lawyers to knock
people down on the streets and take their money. 131 The middle-of-
the-roaders [possibly a majority of lawyers] are attacked from both of
these extreme professional flanks.132
Experience teaches me that questions about advertising and other
business-getting schemes (including such promotional activities as semi-
nars, lawyer referral services,133 and the like) should be assigned to
some special committee or commission that is court appointed rather
than bar appointed. 134 In my opinion, these matters are frequently as
much "economics" as "ethics" or "professional etiquette." The "re-
questors" are not really asking for guidance or advice. They are asking
for, and in many cases demanding, approval.
My worst experience in this area came by way of the "direct
targeted mail" controversy, which was resolved in the case of Shapiro
Mr. Haslitt's eyebrows rose half the height of his forehead towards his
thick white hair. He was really distressed by the Waberski incident, but this
suggestion, and from a partner in the firm, shocked him like sacrilege.
"My dear boy, what are you thinking of?" he expostulated. "I hope I am
not one of those obstinate old fogeys who refuse to march with the times.
We have, as you know, a'telephone instrument recently installed in the
junior clerks office. I believe that I myself proposed it. But a brass plate
upon the door! My dear Jim! Let us leave that to Harley Street and
Southhampton Row!"
131. Cf. B. TUCHMAN, THE MARCH OF FOLLY 59-60 (1984) (from Ms. Tuchman's discus-
sion of "How the Renaissance Popes Provoked the Protestant Secession"):
A physician and surgeon of the hospital of St. John Lateran, [in Renaissance
Rome]... "left the hospital every day early in the morning in a short tunic
and with a cross bow and shot everyone who crossed his path and pock-
eted his money." He collaborated with the hospital's confessor, who
named to him the patients who confessed to having money, whereat the
physician gave these patient's "an effective remedy" and divided the pro-
ceeds with his clerical informer.
Quoted material attributed to one John Burchard, the "master of ceremonies of the
papal court".
132. The proverbial "country dog" scenario ("If you stand still you get screwed
and if you run you get bit").
133. See Rita Henley Jensen, Ad Scheme Spurs Suits, Not Profits; $9.5 Million Op-
eration Snares Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 28, 1991 at 1.
134. Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.135 provides for an Advertising Commission,
which mostly approves whatever comes before it "conditioned upon approval by the
Ethics Committee." Since its members are Court appointed, they are less likely to be
hassled or sued than the Ethics Committee. The method of conditional approval (or is it
conditional disapproval) leaves requestors yelping about bar association delaying tactics,
and shifts the onus of criticism onto the Ethics Committee.
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v. Kentucky Bar Association.13 5 The case provides an object lesson for
well-meaning ethics committee members, to-wit: Don't Try To Be
Helpful.
Louisville lawyer Richard Shapiro 136 asked the Advertising Commis-
sion of the Kentucky Bar Association to approve direct targeted mail.
Specifically, Mr. Shapiro wanted to mail letters to persons he had identi-
fied (by way of the newspaper) as the victims of foreclosure actions.
Of course, this was not an original idea. Direct Targeted Mail was a hot
"ethics" issue, and at about the same time that Mr. Shapiro was making
his request I was receiving correspondence from a lawyer who wanted
to send a direct mail "advertisement" to the widow of an electrocution
victim a couple of days after the unfortunate event caught the atten-
tion of the local newspaper. 137
The Advertising Commission refused to approve of the proposed
mailings, while gratuitously adding that the Supreme Court Rule prohib-
iting direct targeted mailings was unconstitutional under Zauderer.1 38
Mr. Shapiro then asked the KBA Ethics Committee for a Formal Advi-
sory Opinion on the subject, while he also approached the bar Rules
Committee for a legislative rules change. The Rules Committee refused
135. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
136. A nice fellow who supplies me with a fascinating array of samples of adver-
tising gimmickry, from stenciled pens and carry-alls to refrigerator magnets.
137. By 1987 the Virginia Bar had given up and allowed lawyers to mail "solicita-
tion letters" to individuals whose homes were subject to foreclosure. Va. Op. 904
(1987). New York had even gone so far as to allow for direct targeted mailings to
identifiable tort victims. See In re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163 (1984). But the vast
majority of state bar associations and the ABA viewed direct targeted mailings with
alarm, fearing that the family's of accident victim would be victimized by insensitive
lawyers. The Shapiro Court rather clearly told the organized bar that its concerns were
overblown, insignificant, or irrelevant. Oddly enough, an Alabama lawyer was recently
suspended for two years for sending a $25 wreath of flowers along with a note of
condolence and a firm brochure to the funeral of a 19 month old victim of a "day care
tragedy." See Mark Hansen, Solicitation or Sympathy: A Law-firm Brochure and Funeral
Wreath Bring Lawyer's Suspension, 77 A.B.A J. (Sept. 1991), at 34. It is difficult to see
how this disciplinary action can be squared with the Shapiro case.
138. The particular Rule alluded to by the Commission was SCR 3.135. The adop-
tion of that rules followed in time a Kentucky decision which treated non-targeted di-
rect mail (which I will define for convenience as mailings to groups of individuals or
businesses not triggered by a specific event) as protected advertising. Again, the Ethics
Committee is not a body empowered to declare the law or the constitutionality of
particular laws. See infra part IV.A. One assumes that the same is true of the Advertis-
ing Commission. On the other hand, the SCR was almost certainly unconstitutional
under the authority of In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), since Primus protects direct
mail and even solicitation when the lawyer's motives are "non-pecuniary."
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to change the Code or the Supreme Court Rule, and with some reluc-
tance, the Ethics Committee finally agreed to issue an opinion stating
the obvious . . . that there was no room for interpretation or opinion,
since for better or for worse the Code as well as the Supreme Court
Rule clearly prohibited the activity.139 We pointed out that we could
not change the rule (the Rules Committee and the Court legislate in this
area), interpret it away, or declare it unconstitutional. Our thought was
that our Supreme Court could address Mr. Shapiro's concerns by way
of an appeal from our opinion. It was felt that this "route," might be
the most economical and civil way to address what was really a legisla-
tive or judicial matter beyond our powers to resolve. The result was
several rounds of appellate litigation, after which the victorious "appel-
lant" demanded attorney fees from the Bar Association in an amount
that would have roughly equalled five years worth of my salary as a full
Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky. I do not know what fee
award, if any, was ultimately paid from dues of the general member-
ship of the Kentucky Bar, but I do know that one direct product of the
"direct targeted mail revolution" has been increased poaching of
"other lawyers' clients" with an attendant increase in complicated
(three-party) fee disputes. If a client is induced to change horses in mid-
stream as a result of a direct mail feeler, who should get how much of
the ultimate fee? The poacher never explains the potential liabilities or
disadvantages associated with a switch of lawyers. The consumer is al-
most always left surprised and demoralized, not to mention somewhat
poorer, as a result of the inevitable complications. Many advocates of
direct targeted mail have had second thoughts; and my ethics commit-
tee has received many an angry letter from lawyer and layman 14o alike
139. It is not clear to me whether or not the time for "appealing" the Commis-
sions determination had run at this point. I was informed that a suit by Mr. Shapiro
challenging certain aspects of the bar rules was pending in a federal court ( under §
1983) in Louisville. If it was "revived," or if it was still "live" one assumes that it might
have been the vehicle for a fee award. In any event, it was my understanding that the
case went to the United States Supreme Court after an unsuccessful appeal from the
Ethics Committee to the Kentucky Supreme Court. Incidently, the Kentucky Supreme
Court's opinion surprised the Committee as much as it did the Committee, for the
Court invalidated the SCR under Primus (not Zaudere) but then went on and adopted
the ABA Model Rule prohibiting direct targeted mail, a step which the Ethics Committee
did not take and could not have taken. Again, it is seems odd to me that an ethics
committee's refusal to do that which it has no right or power to do should lead to a
raid on the treasury of the state bar, but such is the wonderful world of the jurisprude.
140. I keep a gallery of "classics" in my office. My favorite is a letter to union
workers, using the name of one of their union officers, urging each worker to get a
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about such mailings-"Why are we allowing this?" It never ends. 14 1
Advertising questions? Who needs them? Let the FTC handle the prob-
lem. The FTC must be good for something.14 2
E. Disciplinary Process
If there is a thread that joins my observations it is that ethics com-
mittees must not stray from their primary mission of providing protec-
tive, advisory opinions. Ethics committees should not function as legisla-
tive or judicial bodies, or political action committees. It is even more
important that they be isolated from the disciplinary side of the Force.
Most bar counsel (disciplinary counsel) and bar governors recog-
nize the need for a separation of functions. Nevertheless, decision mak-
ers at all levels are constantly acting as though bar association ethics
committees are part of the disciplinary process. Specifically, ethics com-
mittees are frequently invited or "ordered" to:
(1) provide opinions condemning the conduct of "other" lawyers (a
lawyer who is not making the request for an opinion); or
(2) provide opinions in actual disciplinary cases to disciplinary coun-
sel, the inquiry tribunal, or the disciplinary board, particularly at
early or "intake" stages.
I do not mean to imply that this is done as part of a diabolical plot.
I am simply making the point that persons having legitimate roles to
play in standard-setting attempt to shift their responsibilities to ethics
committees, and attempt to use committee opinions as a short cut. I
will provide some examples, and then discuss the unfortunate
consequences.
free x-ray supplied by Attorney X, which the worker would "need" to find out if they
were entitled to benefits. A "P.S." told them that if they already had a lawyer then they
didn't need this "free x-ray." Another letter suggests to the target widow that the
lawyer was a witness to the accident and therefore has information that might not be
available to other lawyers!
141. The latest request of this genre proposes that the Committee must opine on
the propriety of a lawyer's use of a private mail delivery person who would hand
deliver the lawyer's message and then linger on the recipient's stoop in case the recipi-
ent wishes to "ask questions." The theory seems to be that there can be no "solicita-
tion" if the target speaks first, as in. "What's this?" I call this scenario "Ethics as a
game of Chicken."
142. Those of us who have served on state bar Model Rules Committees have all
received veiled threats from a quasi-official "staff" of the FTC who have contended,
among other things, that NAT rules prohibiting unreasonably high fees (Model Rule 1.5)
violate the antitrust laws. This is consumer protection?
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A good example of the offensive use of an advisory opinion is
provided by a recent request in my jurisdiction. One group of lawyers
complained that other lawyers were forming title insurance companies
jointly owned by the lawyers and a mortgage company (or employees
or shareholders of a mortgage company). The non-lawyer co-owner
(mortgage company or mortgage company employees) would then
channel all of its legal work (associated with real estate closings) to the
lawyer co-owner. An additional requirement of every real estate trans-
action would be that the mortgagor purchase title insurance from the
jointly owned title insurance company. The "profits" from the issuance
of the title policy would be split between the lawyer and non-lawyer
co-owners of the title insurance company.
Now I must confess that I have always had difficulty understanding
how arrangements like this work, and even more trouble figuring out
whether they are illegal or unethical. I am still not sure how I feel about
this particular transaction, partly because the lawyers most concerned
with the practice seemed to know little more about the law of title
insurance and real estate practice than I. But for present purposes it is
enough to note that one group of lawyers was upset with what an-
other group of lawyers was doing. The contention was that the com-
plaining lawyers were being cut out of work. Instead of reporting this
to disciplinary counsel, the lawyers wanted an opinion criticizing the
practice. The pitch was made that if this practice were not condemned,
then they would be "forced" to engage in it themselves. I have to
concede that the complaining lawyers technically complied with the
"jurisdictional rules" of the committee by posing the question "as if"
they intended to engage in the conduct themselves, but I have always
been troubled by this sort of request. It seems to me that the "of-
fended" lawyers should have complained to disciplinary counsel, and
been willing to engage in a robust exchange of views before that body.
In the alternative, they might have urged their "competitors" to seek
an opinion.
As an example of my second category of problem cases, I recall
the time when a lawyer home-buyer complained that a "closing attor-
ney" had overcharged or double charged fees in a transaction. It was
not clear to me whether there was an actual overcharge, but the com-
plainant insisted that the closing documents had not been completed
properly, and that insufficient "disclosures" had been made. The disci-
plinary panel assigned to this dispute referred the matter to me for
guidelines as to the proper way to fill out the papers, and for a "ruling"
as to whether or not the lawyer had committed an ethical violation. I
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returned the request for opinion with a note suggesting that the issue
was whether the lawyer engaged in some kind of deception. There
must be numerous ways to fill out closing documents, and an ethics
committee should not be opining on such technicalities. When there is
deception or misrepresentation, disciplinary authorities are at least as
qualified to recognize it as an ethics committee.
I suspect that these examples of common requests for opinions
will appear trivial to the reader, but I contend that they are a serious
problem. Lawyers will not call ethics committees if they come to associ-
ate such committees with the disciplinary "establishment." In both of
the cases I have described, the ethics committee was asked to act as a
surrogate for disciplinary counsel. This sort of role confusion must, in-
evitably, undermine the credibility of an ethics committee.
F. Consumer Protection
As chairman of an ethics committee, I very quickly learned that
laymen have little recourse when it comes to legal services. Although
lawyer and non-lawyer entrepreneurs are busy marketing all sorts of
"legal insurance," prepaid legal services, estate planning and tax-avoid-
ance packages, it is virtually impossible to get any "Insurance Commis-
sioner" or "Consumer Protection Agency" interested in exercising any
oversight. Instead, all such matters are referred to unfunded, volunteer
ethics committees. Bar leaders ask that the quality of these products
(for example, the extent and value of "coverages") be evaluated. Ironi-
cally, the purveyors of these "products" even have the temerity to
demand that committee members provide them with free legal services
in structuring their "plans" and securing approval of them. 143
G. Expert Witness Services
It is difficult to tell whether the advertising by "ethics consultants"
is directed at an existing market, or whether the effort is an exercise in
market generation. I seldom get calls for advice from outside my state.
Even malpractice insurers do not call. One suspects that the "firms"
have already vacuumed up whatever work there is in this area.
On the other hand, I do get calls from within my state for "expert
opinion" in lawyer malpractice 144 and disciplinary cases, and in other
143. See Ky. Ops. E-344 and E-346 (1991). Bar officials rightly fear that products
will be promoted as "Bar Association Approved."
144. There is a remarkable diversity of views as to the admissibility of expert opin-
ion in malpractice cases, and some lingering hostility to use of the lawyer codes in
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cases in which "ethics issues" arise. My personal view is that such "in-
state" offers of employment should be declined by committee mem-
bers. An ethics committee will not long enjoy the confidence of the
bar-lawyers will not call committee members for advice-if its mem-
bers supply expert witness services for and, more particularly, against
lawyers in the same jurisdiction. It is also unfair and unseemly to allow a
litigant to trade on the present official or semi-official status of a wit-
ness, especially in a jury trial, which is exactly what lawyers want to do.
I will admit that it is difficult for an academic, particularly an academic
that participated in the formulation of the ethics rules of the forum, to
resist an invitation to opine on their construction and application. More-
over, these are not entirely "private" disputes. But restraint is in order.
V. GAMES LAWYERS PLAY: ABUSE OF ETHICS COMMITTEES
_ is very keen on the [book] proposal, but he believes it
must be restructured, if it is to appeal to practitioners: the focus
must be on "ethics as a tool and a weapon." .. . [PIractitioners are
only interested in something they can use or "get screwed by!" 145
Some appeals to the ethics committee will be so clearly "out of
rule" as to justify a suspicion of incipient foul play. I classify as "abu-
sive" the standard methods employed by lawyers to use "advisory
opinions" as a "tool and a weapon." The beginner must also watch out
for other invitations, the acceptance of which will almost certainly mire
the committee and its members in controversy.
A. Tactical Use of Ethics Committees
Anyone bold enough to volunteer for service on a state or local
ethics committee had best have had at least basic training in the arts of
legal guerilla warfare, sufficient in duration and intensity to provide the
trainee with a nodding acquaintance with the techniques of "bad-
mouthing," "brow-beating," and "bully-ragging." 146 The recruit will find
malpractice litigation. For a particularly lawyer favorable (self-serving) view, see Mari-
trans G.P. Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, 572 A.2d 737 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
145. From an Editor's memo to the file summarizing an anonymous reviewer's
comments on a proposal for a book on legal ethics.
146. "Bullyragging" is an American term. See Farmer, Legal Practice and Ethics in
North Carolina 1820-60, 30 N.C. Hist. Rev. 329, 340 (1953). "Browbeating" appears to
be a British import. See J. BENTHAM, INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF THE RATIONALE OF EVIDENCE, Book
i, Ch. 10, Section 4, and Book ii, Ch. 9. See also CHARLES DICKENS, PICKWICK PAPERS, in 1 THE
ANNOTATED DICKENS 328 (E. Guiliano & P. Collins eds.) (examination of Mr. Winkle by Mr.
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that a surprising number of lawyers have arrived at the conclusion that
the members of their local ethics committee are to be treated with the
same contempt and abuse that was once (in a kinder, more gentle, and
more "civil" professional era) reserved for a lawyer's own secretary
and associates. The recruit may even benefit from some fleeting expo-
sure to the truly "hard" styles of adversarial close combat, like crotch-
kicking147 and mustache-removal. 148 I would recommend an additional,
advanced course, in the "softer," indirect arts of manipulating courts
and bar committees - a sort of Aikido 149 of tactical abuse. How can a
lawyer harness or deflect the moral force of a bar committee, and di-
rect it against opposing counsel?
I have already argued that bar committee members should just
"say no" when it comes to serving as expert witnesses in litigation.
Although my policy of self-denial or self-restraint does not flow from
any rule of the court or the bar, it has been announced, and should be
well-understood. 150 Nevertheless, three or four times a year I find (usu-
Skimpin).
147. Compare Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Jernigan, 737 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1987) (a close
encounter of the worst kind between the court and counsel's foot).
148. Disciplinary Counsel v. Levin, 35 Ohio St. 3d 4, 517 N.E.2d 892 (Ohio 1988)
(unambiguous threat to commence mustache removal activities). Contrary to the claims
of those who would civilize us with "civility codes," the possibility (if not the .promise)
of violence has made a substantial contribution to the popularity of the American trial
process throughout the Nation's history. For example, in Farmer, Legal Practice and
Ethics in North Carolina 1829-60, 30 N.C. HIST. REV. 329, 335 (1953) we are told that
"[f]ights between attorneys were common and ... at the conclusion of a bout the
judge would fine the offenders and resume court (a sort of primordial Rule 11)." Else-
where (at p. 335) the author reports on an incident that makes the outrages of "LA
Law" look like "greasy kid stuff":
Carawan, a Baptist preacher, was tried and found guilty of murder. The
judge ordered a recess of one hour; at that moment, the prisoner drew a
pistol and aimed it at the [prosecutor]. The bullet struck above the heart,
cut the cloth of his suit, struck the padding, and fell to the floor. The pris-
oner dropped his pistol, took another, and despite the efforts of the sheriff
to stop him, shot himself. No wonder the courts attracted such a large
crowd! The court was an exciting place.
Compare McPeake v. William T. Cannon, Esq., P.C., 381 Pa. Super. 227, 553 A.2d 439
(1989); Law. Man. Prof. Con. (ABA/BNA) 5:24 (Feb. 15, 1989) (defendant who had just
been found guilty of rape jumped to his death from a courtroom win-
dow- malpractice claim against lawyer dismissed).
149. The "Sound of One Hand Clapping" that so many novices have pondered is
nothing more that the sound of a lawyer slapping palm against forehead, coupled with
the mystical incantation, "Why didn't I see that coming?"
150. Kentucky Bench & Bar Vol. 54, No. 3 (Summer 1990) (notice that Committee
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ally with some embarrassment) that I, or a member of my committee,
have been named as an expert witness in a litigant's pretrial statement.
Lawyers simply list a member of the ethics committee as an expert wit-
ness in civil cases without any permission, contact, or notice. One as-
sumes that the object is bluff -but this can backfire. Occasionally an
opponent who is aware of the committee's policy will challenge the
"expert" designation before the court. More often the opposing coun-
sel will automatically notice all experts (indeed, all witnesses)-for deposi-
tions151 and will get an angry note from the surprised committee mem-
ber. Sometimes the deception will come to light when the opponent
attempts an ex parte interview with the designated expert.1-2
In Virginia Opinion 768153 the Standing Committee on Legal Ethics
of the Virginia State Bar announced that it is a "fraud on the court" for
a lawyer to list the name of a physician as a testifying expert when the
lawyer has not contacted the person named. The particular scenario
addressed by the committee involved the lawyer's preparation of an-
swers to interrogatories. 5 4 The logic of the opinion, and the reference
made in the opinion to DR 1-102(A)(4), would seem to apply to pretrial
statements as well.155 Although I am aware of lawyer lobbied amend-
ments to the Federal Rules that come very close to revoking the Thir-
teenth Amendment, 56 and while I concede that unusual circumstances
might justify the listing of a physician or other expert that the lawyer
has not yet contacted, a court or an opponent would be justified in
characterizing such a representation as "deceptive" - designed either
to bluff or otherwise mislead, or to deny the named "expert" to the
other side.' 5 7
A related problem arises as soon as ethics committees begin to
Chairman "will not serve as compensated expert witness either for or against a lawyer
in Kentucky, while serving in that capacity).
151. But compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i), which like the majority of state rules
patterned after it, e.g., KY. R. Civ. P. 26.02(4Xa)(i)], does not allow for depositions of
experts except by agreement or by leave of court on motion.
152. In many states such contacts are viewed as unethical. See UNDERWOOD & FOR-
TUNE, TRIAL ETHICS, § 5.4.2 (1988).
153. (1986); Law. Man. Prof. Con. (ABA/BNA) 901:8703 (1991).
154. See MODEL CODE DR 1-102(A)(4); DR 7-102(A)(4)(5) and (8); Model Rules 4.1
and 8.3(c).
155. Such a designation could be used to discourage the opponent from contact-
ing the person listed, and in an extreme case could result in a sort of "cornering of the
market" of a category of experts.
156. FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
157. This problem is addressed in Ky. Op. E-348 (1991).
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expand their services by providing informal letter opinions. Again, these
opinions should serve only as "protection" in the event that a discipli-
nary charge is later filed and committees are advised to include stock
disclaimers, or expressions of limitation or qualification in their informal
letter opinions. Nevertheless, no matter what precautions are taken,
some of these letters will be attached to motion papers and passed off
as "expert testimony." 158 Such motions will usually be defensive--in-
tended to head off or respond "definitively" to a motion to disqualify
or the like. Sometimes the motions will be offensive in the tactical sense
of the word, and seek disqualification or condemnation of the oppo-
nent's lawyer. 159 In response, opposing counsel will demand a meeting
with the committee, or will insist on a "right" to "oral argument"
before the committee, or some other "corrective" action (an opinion
favorable to the opponent's side). The signitor of the letter opinion
may receive a notice that his or her deposition [lawyers send out no-
tices of depositions almost as a reflex action these days] will be taken in
some remote corner of the state, or on some hilariously inconvenient
date, like Thanksgiving or Christmas, and all in violation of the rules
governing depositions.16 0 Such demands, maneuvers, and "billable-
hour" feeding frenzies will almost always be served up with a rather
large side order of "moral indignation."
Even after accounting for the possibility that the lawyers involved
in such practices may be pure of heart but monumentally dense, one
must still come to the conclusion that some lawyers are more than will-
ing to stoop to shameful levels to exploit the name or influence of the
committee and bar association, to get free expert opinion, or in some
cases to leverage opposing counsel by hinting at the possibility of disci-
plinary difficulties. 16
158. Id.
159. I have seen this referred to as "blindsiding"; the defensive use of such opin-
ions being referred to as "sandbagging." Of course, these terms are commonly used to
describe all kinds of "lawyer tricks."
160. See, e.g., KY. R Civ. P. 26.02(4)(a)(i) (deposition of testifying expert only on
motion after use of interrogatories); KY. R. Civ. P. 45.04(3) ("A resident of the state may
be required to attend an examination only in the county wherein he resides or is em-
ployed or transacts his business in person, or at such other convenient place as is fixed
by an order of the court.").
161. Compare Ky. Op. E-265 (1983) (threats of disciplinary charges) and Ky. R. of
Prof. Conduct 3.4(f).
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B. Politics, the Media, and Ethics Committees
Modern journalism may not be any worse than it was in the
"Guilded Age," but it is probably not much better. It may be hard for
lawyers to believe this, but on a slow day the print media in particular
will almost always opt for some kind of "shorty" about a local judge or
lawyer. Just as lawyers are loath to "fall back on the merits" of their
cases, journalists are loath to do any spadework. The key to journalistic
success these days is the production of grotesque and shocking quotes
in time for the editorial deadlines. The call goes out to the bar associa-
tion or to some well known local lawyer "source" (politician or other
variety of big mouth). If the bar association or source wishes to dump
the matter (to avoid controversy or whatever), then the caller will be
referred to the Ethics Committee, to whom all blessings flow. The Un-
holy sea of politics also contributes calls of this genre, as one opponent
attempts to trick the committee into serving up some official looking
condemnation of the other. For example, I have had a lawyer office-
seeker attempt to get an opinion that the incumbent lawyer office-
holder was "unethical" because he was using a partnership style firm
name while characterizing himself as a sole practitioner for public rela-
tions purposes, and justifying this on the ground that he and his part-
ners were "office sharers." ' 162 In another incident a reporter had been
"tipped" to the red-hot fact that an assistant prosecutor was engaged
in "unethical" and "illegal" conduct by living in a "foreign" county in
violation of some obscure local law (which it is hard to believe anyone
would actually care about). In another case a reporter wanted a verbal
condemnation of a judge who had rather foolishly testified as a charac-
ter witness for a former court employee. 163 As news events go these
items strike me as singularly uninteresting, but the point I wish to make
is that it is assumed that the ethics committee is some sort of official
"source." The furthest I have ever been willing to go by way of being
"helpful" has been to provide information on the language of the
Code and Rules as "background." To those who are more easily
swayed by ingratiation or threat, I urge some consideration of my
motto: "Never Trust A News Dog."
162. Ky. R. of Prof. Conduct 7.5, like the ABA Model Rule, prohibits lawyers who
share office space but who are not in fact partners from using a partnership style name
as, for example, "Smith and Jones."
163. KY. SUP. CT. R. 4.300 (Code of Judicial Conduct), Canon 2B., provides that "[A
judge] should not testify voluntarily as a character witness."
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C. The Ethics Committee and the Free Lunch
I have already noted that committees reject "questions of law" in
the vain hope of rebutting the presumption that their members are free
law clerks or "go-fors." Nevertheless, a "free-lunch" mentality prevails.
Worse than that, the committee is treated as a sort of landfill for com-
plaints from clients and others.
In the former category ("free-lunching") is the common practice of
blending "ethics" questions with practice questions. This is understand-
able and to some extent unavoidable, if annoying. 164 It is more difficult
to understand why any question sent to the Attorney General dealing
in some way or another with lawyers or the judicial system should be
forwarded to the Ethics Committee, or why requests for copies of the
Code, the Rules, the Judicial Code, the Bar Journal, and the like are
routinely forwarded to the Committee. Perhaps the most annoying
practice (other than secretarial screening out our return calls to lawyers
who have, only moments before, called me and asked me to drop
everything for their "emergency" has to do with lawyers who request
copies of formal opinions that they could very well fetch for them-
selves, or requests for copies of letter opinions that "[we] sent them at
around [such-and-such a date] but which [they] can't seem to find at
the moment. " 165
In the latter (ethics committee as landfill) category are "requests"
that are nothing more than referrals of angry clients of other lawyers.
Lawyers simply will not report other lawyers166 and shuck off the un-
pleasant task. I have even had lawyers report other lawyers to me
(knowing that I have nothing to do with the disciplinary system) and
then lecture me on my ethical duty to report what has just been re-
ported to me ...professional responsibility as a game of tag, if you
will. I sometimes wonder if the correspondence or phone call involved
has been billed to some client.
VI. A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Any fool can make a rule, and every fool will mind it.167
164. The Rules, like their Code counterparts, are loaded with circular references
to the law. See Rules 3.4, 3.5, and 4.4. Furthermore, knowing disobedience to the rules
of the tribunal may lead to discipline. See, e.g., Rule 3.4(c).
165. See infra at note 166.
166. See supra at notes 10-12.
167. H.D. Thoreau, Winter, 3 Feb. 1860.
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Unlike many of my colleagues, I do not feel compelled to express
unalloyed admiration for Mr. Thoreau. In any event, I know at least a
few lawyers who are fools, and I doubt that they have ever had occa-
sion to read, let alone follow, any rules.
In this instance the rule that concerns me is proposed Kentucky
Supreme Court Rule 3.530. It reflects amendments authorizing what
many would refer to as a telephone "hotline." It is not proferred as a
Model Ethics Committee Rule. Choice of words, not to mention the
flow of those words, is somewhat eccentric. It is not "complete" -the
Rule does not address immunity, or even indemnity, for the protection
of the volunteer members of the committee. 168 However, the rule
does provide an illustration of how a "small" bar association has at-
tempted to deal with some of the problems alluded to in this article.
Emphasis has been added to highlight important features of the rule,
and the rule will be annotated with references to the rules of other
state bar associations. I have divided the text of the rule in order to
provide room for commentary on its various subsections.
RULE 3.530 ADVISORY OPINIONS- INFORMAL AND FORMAL
(1) Any attorney who is in doubt as to the propriety of
(a) any professional act contemplated by the requesting lawyer, or.
The rule only authorizes the committee to issue "advisory opin-
ions" that relate to "contemplated" (future) conduct of the lawyer that
is "requesting" the opinion. Once again, the sole purpose of an advi-
sory opinion is to help a lawyer avoid an unnecessary mistake that
might subject the lawyer to discipline. Lawyers should not be en-
couraged or permitted to use a committee as an expert witness for the
defense or to obtain an opinion issued on an ex parte recitation of the
facts in order to paper over conduct that has already occurred. Given
the "advisory" and "protective" functions of opinions, it is neither nec-
essary nor desirable for the committee to furnish opinions to non-law-
yers or to lawyers who are concerned about the conduct of other
lawyers.
* . . (b) course of conduct or any act of any person or entity which
may constitute the unauthorized practice of law ....
The bar associations of many states issue opinions regarding unau-
168. One state bar committee suspended operations in an effort to draw atten-
tion to the need for immunity. See ABA/BNA Law. Man. Prof. Con. 903 (Aug. 7, 1985).
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thorized practice of law. The desirability of lawyer "regulation" of un-
authorized practice is debatable. In the opinion of many, it would be
preferable if "advisory opinions" regarding unauthorized practice were
issued by the Attorney General or by the Court. Such a reassignment
of responsibilities might alleviate some of the perennial concerns about
the application of the antitrust laws to the activities of bar associations.
Unfortunately, neither the courts nor the elected officials of the bar
appear to share these concerns, and in my state, at least, neither the
Court nor any agency or other official has indicated any willingness to
take on the work.
The "system" allows anyone (judge, lawyer or layman) to request
a "UP opinion," regardless of whose conduct is in question, regardless
of motive, and regardless of whether the conduct has already oc-
curred. Such requests are usually made in lieu of a complaint to the
prosecutor or to the bar counsel. 169 In fact, the bar counsel routinely
requests such opinions prior to initiating "enforcement" activities, and
often uses committee opinions to persuade alleged violators to "cease
and desist." This is a cheap, generally efficient, and entirely logical
method of operation from bar counsels point of view, but it does have
the unfortunate effect of turning the unauthorized practice committee
into a de facto enforcement agency. Needless to say, virtually all re-
quests for UP opinions come from judges and lawyers, who are able to
remain anonymous by routing their "complaints" or demands for en-
forcement through the committee ". . . . may request in writing, or in
emergencies by telephone to the Committee Member designated for
the requestor's Judicial District, for an Advisory opinion thereon. Local
Bar Associations may also request advisory opinions . ... "
Most bar rules require that requests be in writing, although the
formalities are few. In my jurisdiction lawyers have a particular, not to
mention peculiar, aversion to letter-writing, and the practice of
telephoning the Chairman of the Ethics Committee arose early on.
Phone requests for "instant" opinions soon became the norm. Expecta-
169. In most states unauthorized practice is a criminal offense, and an action may
be initiated by a prosecutor. See, e.g., Va. R. of Ct., Part Six, Section I. (Unauthorized
Practice Rules and Considerations -Introduction) ("By statute, any person practicing law
without being duly licensed is guilty of a misdemeanor. The Attorney General of Vir-
ginia may leave the prosecution to the local attorney for the Commonwealth .... ")
Frequently the penalty or fine is the same as a year's worth of bar dues, which shows
that somebody has a sense of humor anyway. Ky. Sup. Ct. R, 3.460 also provides for
investigations and special enforcement proceedings initiated upon complaint to the Di-
rector of the Bar. Most complaints come from attorneys, who seek anonymity.
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tions have become "demands" for "rights."
Now, it is a matter of common knowledge that clients do not like
to be charged for lawyer time spent in securing ethics opinions, and
lawyers prefer to avoid "non-billable" interruptions. For this reason,
perhaps, calls tend to "clump" at the end of the day (or at night, to the
Chairman's home). At one point the calls became so numerous that I
[as Chairman] had to declare a moratorium pending the development
of a more sensible "hot-line" arrangement. Unfortunately, this morato-
rium has provided little relief, since most lawyers do not read or honor
anything announced in the bar journal anyway. Few have any interest
in the tribulations of others. Lawyers call anyway, or "FAX" their ques-
tions and demand an immediate return "FAX."
The new Rule attempts to deal with this increasing demand for
services, but it makes two assumptions which may prove unrealistic.
The lawyer is asked to call in only a genuine emergency; and then to
call the "hotline" volunteer assigned to his or her geographical area.
It seems perfectly clear that it would be more desirable for a state
bar association to fund a full-time "hotline" staff. However, it also
seems likely that only the bar associations of a few of the larger states
will be able to support such bureaucracies. In the final analysis, the
most fundamental problem with "hotlines" is not their "inherent limita-
tions," but the fact that the majority of lawyers will not want to pay for
services provided to "other" lawyers. On the other side of the
counter, few qualified "experts" will be willing to invest their time and
effort without the promise of some "professional" level of compensa-
tion for their services.
... The Committee Member to whom the request is directed shall
attempt to promptly furnish the requestor with a written informal
letter opinion as to the propriety of the act or course of conduct in
question. A copy of any informal opinion should be provided to
the Director for safekeeping and statistical purposes. Otherwise, all
inquiries shall be treated as confidential, although the Rule does not
create an attorney-client relationship .... 170
Informal letter opinions will be the norm. Formal opinions are too
long in the oven, and even a half-baked loaf is better than starvation. In
a small state such as my own, the "Chairman" can expect to write
170. I am reporting the rule as it was proposed. It would appear that the language
relating to confidentiality and the caveat (no "attorney-client relationship") was inadver-
tently left out of the version sent to the Supreme Court. Such is life. It's hard to be an
Ethics Chairman.
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several hundred such letter opinions a year. In larger states the work-
load must be staggering.171
It is important that someone at the bar headquarters receive and
keep a copy of formal and informal opinions, and not just for statistical
purposes. In my experience, the lawyers that request opinions do not
do a very good job of "keeping" them (particularly unfavorable opin-
ions), and in no event will a lawyer invest any "billable-hours" actually
looking for an opinion when it is needed. Since most committees will
be understaffed and underfunded it is more than a little unfair to ex-
pect committee volunteers to warehouse and index their letter opin-
ions (or even formal opinions) on their own time and at their own ex-
pense. It is unreasonable to expect them to ferret out, copy, and mail
(or FAX) backup copies for the convenience of the requestor, bar
counsel, or other interested (or simply curious) folk. Moreover, since
the Director [chief administrative official] of the Bar will receive com-
plaints against lawyers for appropriate processing,1 72 the Director's of-
fice is the logical repository for "protective opinions" issued to "re-
spondent" lawyers. Of course, there may be instances in which, for
one reason or another, the requestor will not wish to have the advice
received "on file." I have always honored such requests but I have
tried to advise the requestor that I cannot assure them of the "retrieva-
bility" of any correspondence sent to them. In any event, the problem
of lawyer reticence returns us to the need for some assurance of
confidentiality.
The rule under discussion follows the ABA model by explicitly pro-
viding for confidentiality.1 73 However, it also adds an important dis-
claimer precluding belated claims of reliance on advice of the commit-
tee for purposes other than that set forth in the rule (protection from
discipline). If lawyers want an "advice of counsel defense," or the
back-up of someone else's malpractice insurance policy, they should
hire and pay a lawyer. Another desirable amendment might be an ex-
emption of lawyer committee members from any reporting require-
ment or "snitch rule." 1 74 Such an exemption is unnecessary in Kentucky
171. See ABA/BNA Law. Man. Prof. Con. 37 (Vol. 7, No. 2, Feb. 27, 1991) (report-
ing 2,500 to 3,000 calls per year to the Virginia bar counsel).
172. See, e.g., Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.160 (initiation of disciplinary cases through the
filing of a"sworn written statement" with the Director).
173. See ABA Standing Comm. on Professional Resp., Rule'of Procedure 13.
174. Most states that have "Impaired Attorney" or "Lawyers Helping Lawyers
Committees" exempt such committees from any reporting requirement. UNDERWOOD &
FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS § 1.7.2. (1988). Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.130(2) used to
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due to the Supreme Court's deletion of the reporting requirement from
that state's version of the Model Rules. 17 5
... (2) If the Chairman of either the Ethics or Unauthorized Practice
Committees determines that a question is of sufficient importance,
the Chairman may cause to be issued and furnish a Formal Advi-
sory Opinion prepared by the Committee, to the Board of Gover-
nors, for approval as a Formal Opinion. Such approval shall require
a vote of three-fourths of the voting members present at the meet-
ing of the Board. If the Board is unable to adopt a Formal Opinion,
the Committee shall furnish the requestor with an informal opinion,
with a copy to the Director ....
This portion of the rule deals with the political176 realities. It at-
tempts to strike a balance by giving the Committee Chairman some
discretion as to which opinions will be submitted for publication as for-
mal opinions. On the other hand, publication invites Board editorship if
not authorship. The "three-quarter vote" rule does provide some as-
surance that the "professional consensus" will be supported by more
than a bare majority.
(3) Such informal and formal opinions shall be advisory only;
however, no attorney shall be disciplined for any professional act
on [the attorney's] part performed in compliance with an opinion
furnished to [the attorney] on [the attorney's] petition, provided his
petition clearly, fairly, accurately and completely states his [or her]
contemplated professional act ....
This is the "guts" of the rule. Any opinion issued is advisory only.
Such an opinion does not bind any court. It does not bind an oppo-
nent, who, for example, wishes to move to disqualify a lawyer who has
already obtained a "favorable" opinion on a conflict of interest issue.
Indeed, an advisory opinion does not technically bind the "requesting"
lawyer. It does not prevent that lawyer from doing anything. It simply
provide that:
Members of the Association's Lawyers Helping Lawyers Committee ...
shall be under no ethical obligation to disclose to the Inquiry tribunal any
evidence of unethical or unprofessional conduct discovered in the course
of the committee's work, nor shall any committee member testify before a
trial commissioner concerning a respondent in a disciplinary case without
the written consent of the respondent.
175. Rule 8.3 was deleted from the Kentucky version of the Model Rules at some
point during the Supreme Court's deliberations.
176. See discussion at part lI.B.
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protects a lawyer from discipline if he or she follows the advice
given. 177
One assumes that the curious string of adverbial qualifiers (that the
petition must "clearly, fairly, and accurately and completely" set forth
the relevant facts) was added to respond to or to deter all the forms of
clever manipulation known to practitioners. 178 Implicit in the rule is the
notion that an inquiry tribunal or other disciplinary body is entitled to
look beyond the "four corners" of the protective opinion if reasonable
suspicion warrants.
* . .(4) All formal opinions of the Board shall be published in full or
in synopsis form, as determined by the Director, in the edition of
the [state bar journal] next issued after the adoption of the opinion
As the next section of the statute indicates, publication in the bar
journal is a precondition to "appealability." Furthermore, any lawyer
who really wants a collection of opinions will have them in his or her
collection of bar journals. Unfortunately, many lawyers throw away
their copies, and there is a clamor in most states for some kind of
"state bar handbook" containing the state professional code or rules as
well as the interpretive "gloss. 179
(5) Any person or entity aggrieved or affected by a formal
opinion of the Board may file with the Clerk within thirty (30) days
after the end of the month of publication of the [state bar journal
in which the full opinion or synopsis thereof is published, a copy of
the opinion, and upon motion and reasonable notice in writing to
the Director, obtain a review of the Board's opinion by the Court.
The Court's action thereon shall be final and the Clerk shall furnish
copies of the formal order to the original petitioner, the movant,
and the Director ....
It was thought that a mechanism for appellate review would allevi-
ate anti-trust concerns. Appellate review also provides an additional
way for an interested party to seek legislative action (the Court is the
body that "legislates" rules governing lawyers, at least in most states)
177. See part Ill.
178. See part VII.
179. The Virginia State Bar provides its members with a handbook containing the
Code and published ethics opinions. The Young Lawyers Conference of the Tennessee
Bar Association recently published a handbook on ethics containing the Code, formal
ethics opinions, the rules governing disciplinary enforcement, and a bibliography. See
Tennessee: Young Lawyers Publish Ethics Handbook, PROF. LAW. 9, 10 (Aug. 1991).
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since the Committee cannot change the rules. Appellate review also
provides a forum for the resolution of "legal" and constitutional ques-
tions. Finally, appellate review invites meaningful, and serious, input in
the relatively few cases (when formal opinions are issued) in which a
large number of practitioners may be interested. It is important to note
that the suggestion that someone might be "aggrieved by" or "ad-
versely affected by" ethics opinions is the judicial language of "stand-
ing." In the context of appellate review of advisory opinions, the lan-
guage is not really apropos-review should not be so restricted.
Furthermore, the use of this familiar jargon tends to incite, in the truly
paranoid at least, feelings of alienation and oppression. Since such opin-
ions ordinarily have "no legal effect and [are] not binding on any judi-
cial or administrative tribunal"'180 it might be better if the right to appeal
were given to any member of the bar "who disagrees with the re-
sult,"' 181 or if an invitation to give written comments were extended to
any interested person. 82
My own view is that the appeal mechanism does provide a
needed measure of democratic participation, and invites some measure
of adversarial give-and-take. However, I must again emphasize that
very few formal opinions are read, let alone appealed, and that the
costs of such appeals frequently exceed any benefits derived from the
process.
VII. REFLECTIONS: PROBLEMS WITH LAWYERS AND LAWYERS' ETHICS
"You will observe the Rules of Battle of course?" the White Knight
remarked, putting on his helmet too.
"I always do," said the Red Knight, and they began banging away
at each other with such fury that Alice got behind a tree to get out
of the way of the blows.183
Up to this point I have focused on the propositions that lawyers
180. Compare Virginia Rules of Court, Part Six: Section IV, 7T 10(c)(vi) and 10 (f)
(iv). However, if an opinion is reviewed by the Supreme Court of Virginia, it can be-
come "a decision of the Court." Id. at 1 10(g)(v).
181. Id. at T 10(c)(v) (appeal to Council).
182. Id. at 10(d),(e) and (g). The Virginia Rule contains an interesting provision
requiring that in the event that an advisory opinion is reviewed by the Council of the
Virginia State Bar, the Attorney General of Virginia must file comments analyzing any
",restraint on competition which may result from the promulgation and implementation
of the advisory opinion."
183. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1872).
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do need timely assistance in answering questions of professional ethics,
and that state bar associations can be a valuable source of such assis-
tance. Along the way I have suggested that much of the academic criti-
cism of such committees, as well as much of the criticism from the
"trenches," is more foul than fair.
Nevertheless, I have admitted that there is still room for the paid
ethics consultant to operate. Ethics committees try not to become
overly involved in disqualification motions, malpractice suits, and disci-
plinary and fee cases. Furthermore, ethics committees cannot serve as
counsel, or insulate a lawyer from the consequences of his or her past
conduct. For that reason, we can probably expect to see (or suffer) the
emergence of yet another cadre of highly paid experts. I should proba-
bly cash in rather than complaining.
I have also pointed out that the principal problem with ethics com-
mittees may be something that no "critic" has ever mentioned. Specifi-
cally, if bar associations deliver on promises to provide instant opinions,
lawyers will surely use their committees as "decision makers." Lawyers
will not think these questions through on their own. Instead they will
simply abdicate. They will become, if you will, systematically, profes-
sionally irresponsible.
I would like to close with some rather pessimistic observations
about lawyers and their professional ethics. The reader may be
shocked by these comments, and may dismiss them. I cannot prove
that any of my observations are true, or that any of my predictions are
more or less likely to come about. But I do not think that anything I am
saying can safely be dismissed as the observations of a "lawyer baiter"
or professional outsider who "does not understand."
My first point ties into my fear that lawyers will attempt to shift off
responsibility for ethical decision making as bar "hotlines" are intro-
duced. It is that while self-regulation may never have been very "effi-
cient" or "effective," professional solidarity, peer pressure, and the
shared, albeit artificial, morality of the guild was something. It was some
restraint on misconduct. But the "psychological impact" of Bates was
profound. 184 The new politics of the profession are about what The Bar
["They"] is ["are"] doing to lawyers ["Us"], or preventing lawyers
["Us"] from doing. As Professor Hazard has put it (although I don't
know that he was making the same point), we have been in steady
retreat from the enforcement of a body of "fraternal norms issuing
184. See PETER M. BROWN, RASCALS: THE SELLING OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 49 (1989).
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from an autonomous professional society," 185 and we have been
headed toward a minimalist legal model. Whatever professional ethics
are left will amount to "a body of judicially enforced regulations."' 186
Even these remaining minimalist rules will be under siege constantly, as
lawyer lobby groups, each with their own interpretive committee,
whittle away at them.
Ironically, this trend may have been invited by the "Ethics Revolu-
tion" that brought standardized ethics training to the law schools and
the Continuing Legal Education circuit, as well as wholesale revision of
the Canons, and more recently the of Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity. A new interest in the lawyer codes was sparked, but business was
booming. Consequently the new interest was superficial. Lawyers did
not identify values in the traditional rules to which they were being
reintroduced (or in many cases, introduced to for the first time). In-
stead, all to many lawyers saw rules or values that were inconvenient
for firms and clients. Moreovee, lawyers learned that the rules could be
rewritten or eliminated with relative ease.187 Self-interest is the only jus-
tification for the language of Comment [20] to Model Rule 1.6:
Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 [Confidenti-
ality] is a matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these Rules,
but a presumption should exist against such a supersession.
185. Geoffrey Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1249 (1991).
186. Id. The Model Rules seem to concede the problem:
The Rules do not ...exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that
should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be com-
pletely defined by legal rules.
MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT, PREAMBLE, SCOPE AND TERMINOLOGY (1989). For extended
criticism of the Rules see Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked
About Ethics; A Critical View Of The Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. LJ. 243 (1985).
187. Professor Sara Beale argues that new Model Rule 3.8 (lawyer subpoenas) is
essentially special legislation requested by the private bar, which has greater power in
the ABA than prosecutors and government lawyers. BEALE, LOOKING FOR LAW IN ALL THE
WRONG PLACES: ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS ON LAWYER SUBPOENAS. She points out that Rules like
3.8 and 1.6 appeal to powerful interest groups like the corporate and securities bar, as
well as the criminal defense bar. Her case may be overstated, but she is correct in
observing that the Rules are being modified out of self interest. For a rule change based
on economics see New Model Rule 1.17. For an ethics committee that seems unneces-
sary except as a lobbying force, consider the Ethics Advisory Committee of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. My own view is that the opinions of such
committees can be useful to folks like me, giving us a sense of "perspective." But they
can also be hopelessly self-serving. They are not formally incorporated into the law of
any forum for purposes of lawyer protection, and while they may be of some value as
persuasive authority they may provide a false sense of security.
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Along the same lines, in the Preamble, we find the notion that "the
lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose information should not
be subject to reexamination." Can an ethics code, drafted by a profes-
sional group, and pushed through a governing board and state su-
preme court actually override state law? Can it override federal law?188
The "presumption" built into the rules is worse than wishful thinking. It
is dangerously misleading. 189
Or how about the following excerpts from the Model Rules:
[The Rules] are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.... The
fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for
sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary au-
thority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding
or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule ...
[N]othing in the Rules should be deemed to augment any substan-
tive legal duty of lawyers or the extradisciplinary consequences of
violating such a duty.'19
It is not so much that I disagree with these comments. I simply
think they send the wrong message. Lawyers read them as a grant of
immunity. What I am driving at is that if lawyers are going to have a
committee make their judgment calls, if lawyers are not going to police
each other, if discipline is going to be short-circuited by secrecy, ineffi-
ciency, and indifference, if the professional rules are going to be
deemed irrelevant in civil litigation,' 9' if judicial enforcement is going to
be so limited as to deny meaningful remedies to aggrieved litigants,19 2
and if lawyers are going to continue to pretend that their privately
drafted guide rules exempt them from compliance with the law, then
all of this should be condemned as a public relations exercise.
Does the bar share any of my concerns? The word on the profes-
188. For recent lobbying efforts by "Big Firms" to minimize the effect of conflicts
rules by liberal provision for screening see Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers,
§ 204(2) (Tentative Draft No. 4 1991). Compare Hazard, supra note 179, at 1259 (dis-
cussing the practicing bars reception of the Kutak Commission's work product). When
these issues were candidly addressed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, the bar was
inclined to blame the draftsmen for acknowledging legal realities and reacted with
shock and outrage.
189. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
190. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, PREAMBLE, SCOPE AND TERMINOLOGY (1989).
191. One assumes that the SEC and the IRS do not entertain this "presumption."
192. Compare Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163, 167 (Mich. 1981) (it would be
"patently unfair" not to hold that a violation of the Code is "rebuttable evidence of
malpractice").
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sional "street" is that the really big problems we face are problems of
"incivility" and frivolous litigation,19 3 and unreasonable consumer com-
plaints stemming from overly restrictive and complex professional rules.
I contend that the problem is not so much a lack of courtesy as it is an
abundance of cupidity. The problem is not frivolous litigation or an ex-
cess of litigation. The problem is an excess of litigation that is fueled by
lawyer self-interest ("file churning") as opposed to litigation in the cli-
ent's interest.' 9 4 I would also submit that when lawyers get into trouble
these days, it is not because they are being tripped up by tricky bar
rules. They are simply being caught - usually in the act of "ripping off"
a client, a third party payor, or, on a less personal but frequently more
profitable basis, caught in the act of pillaging the bank account of the
Taxpayer. 195 Before the reader breaks out into the obligatory rash of
indignation, I suggest that he or she flip through the pages of any re-
cent issue of the ABA Journal19 6 or peruse the growing literature criticiz-
ing the modern law factory.19
193. There are perfectly respectable critics of the use of the Codes and Rules in
the context of disqualification. See, e.g., Steven H. Goldberg, The Former Client's Dis-
qualification Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REV. 226
(1987). Some courts have gone so far as to deny standing to "nonclients" in order to
discourage "tactical" motions. See In re Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215
(Del. 1990). But the nagging question is whether the bar will pay any attention to the
conflicts rules if the courts will not enforce them.
194. See, e.g., John J. Curtin, Jr., Civil Matters, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 8 (discussing
the Report of the Seventh Circuit's Ad Hoc Committee on Civility).
195. See Blackburn v. Goettel-Blanton, 898 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1990). I have on my
desk a "complaint" alleging that a lawyer took a divorce on a contingent fee (unethical)
and then settled, no doubt after much grumping, for an hourly rate fee of approxi-
mately $160,000 out of a $500,000 cut of a marital estate (plaintiff presumably netting
$340,000). Lawyers find this sort of efficiency acceptable, but the complainant sug-
gested that multiple depositions of the same witness, and similar duplication, accounted
for the fee.
196. The Savings & Loan spotlight is now focusing on the lawyer "gatekeepers."
See FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990) (deliberate violations of the law for
the sake of fee generation). Compare the ABA response to the problem: Henry J.
Reske & Don J. DeBenedictis, Ethics Proposals Draw Fire, A.B.A. J. 34 (Oct. 1991).
197. See, e.g., A.L. Presser, The Case of the Vanishing Lawyer, A.B.A. J. 26 (May
1991) (a lawyer disappears with 15 million belonging to his clients, friends, and business
partners; page 27, a lawyer is indicted for "overbilling," which is a rather bland label for
a complaint that includes allegations that the lawyer charged his firm for an $86,221
Cartier ring); Edward Frost, Top P.1 Lawyer Convicted, A.B.A. J., 28 (May 1991) (promi-
nent New York City lawyer is convicted of "orchestrat[ing) a web of fraud in his firm's
lawsuits"); Steve Franco, Savings & Loan Lawyers, A.B.A. J. 52 (May, 1991) (A feature
article on the role of lawyers in the S&L fiasco); Don J. DeBenedictis, The Alliance,
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In the meantime, the dialogue about "ethics" will continue to go
on all around us, but all too frequently in the form of finely spun tech-
nical arguments aimed at the generation of fees. 198 Sometimes it is so
rarefied that it seems lighter than air, like so much of the "entrail-learn-
ing" 196 we already find too much of in those documents we so inap-
propriately label "briefs." 1 97
Perhaps it will eventually come to pass that I will be on a panel of
lawyers at a CLE "show" delivering the mandatory two-hours of ethics,
and, some lawyer will dismiss criticism of the ethics of the profession in
the same way that a journalist recently dismissed criticism during an-
other "show" in which I was a contributor. The journalist (or was it a
lawyer for journalists, with all apparent sincerity, opined that he fol-
lowed no ethical rules other than rule one-get the story- and was
not bound to, since journalism is a trade and not a profession after all! I
guess if you do not call yourself a professional, then you don't have to
have any "ethics," since "ethics" are a sort of formality. Tradespersons
need only look to the market, which will take care of itself.198 If "[t]he
A.B.A. J. 59 (Dec. 1989) (discussing an alleged nationwide conspiracy of lawyers-"The
Alliance" -to overbill and otherwise defraud insurance companies); Don J. DeBenedic-
tis, Alliance Convictions, A.B.A. J. 18 (Sept. 1991) (reporting the convictions of many of
the Alliance conspirators as well as the disappearance of the scam's "mastermind");
and, Henry J. Reske, Callins Guilty of Bribery, A.B.A. J. 32 (Sept. 1991) (reporting the
bribery conviction of a federal judge).
195. Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659 (1990). This important
article was dismissed by one commentator from "the practice" with the observation
that its author simply "does not like lawyers."
196. The use of ethics rules to thwart legitimate discovery is one of the worst
examples. Compare what I have always considered the intended interpretation of Rule
4.2 in ABA Formal Op. 91-359 (1991) to the use of the rule by the defense bar in cases
like Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass. 1987) (lawyer
argued that former corporate employees were not in control of the corporation and
did not have to be produced, but simultaneously charged that the opponent was "un-
ethical" for attempting to interview them).
197. Compare Aristophanes, The Clouds, lines 163-166, B.B. Rogers (Trans. and
Barrister-at-Law), Loeb Classical Library: "So the rump is the trumpet of the gnats! 0
happy, happy in your entrail-learning!
Full surely need he fear nor debts nor duns, Who knows about the entrails of
gnats."
198. "Legal Brief" is an oxymoron. See, e.g., Marson v. Jones and Laughlin Steel
Corp., 87 F.R.D. 151, 152 n.1 (E.D. Wis. 1980). The New York Times Law section re-
cently reported (May 24, 1991) that the Supreme Court of Texas had dismissed an
appeal because the "brief" had violated both the spirit and the letter of the Court's
rules. According to the article, the offending law firm's motion for leave to file a 103
page "brief" was denied, whereupon the firm squeezed 75 pages worth of material
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practice of law deals mostly with the getting and keeping of money,"
what the hey. 199
into 45 1/2 pages by shrinking the print size. The "kicker" is that while one partner in the
firm is continuing to challenge the "unreasonableness" of the Court's rule, another
partner is citing the rule offensively against another firm in an unrelated case, whining
that the opponent's brief exceeds the limits. Another lawyer who is challenging the
Court's rule is quoted as complaining "It's rather strange to me that having been
screwed up by the court, they're willing to drop the thing on someone else. You don't
take a position that something is unfair, unequal, unreasonable, and all those jolly good
words and then turn around and stuff someone else with it a month later." David
Margolick, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1991, at 136.
199. But see K. Lux, ADAM SMITH'S MISTAKE: How A MORAL PHILOSOPHER INVENTED ECO-
NOMICS AND ENDED MORALITY (1990). Efforts to "deprofessionalize" remind me of the re-
cent efforts to "go private" to avoid business and securities regulation. Fortunately, not
everyone is on the "deprofessionalizing" bandwagon. A student passed me a news
clipping for my door [I have a well decorated office door]. I cannot identify the paper,
since it was clipped off the excerpt. It reports that there was recently a convention of
Elvis Impersonators. There were workshops involving such pressing questions as
whether there was too much focus on the "Vegas Era" as opposed to the "Leather"
and "Gold Lame" eras. But the most exciting topic under discussion was whether there
should be a Code of Ethics for Elvis Impersonators. If you don't believe me, come
"read my clips." Hazard, supra note 179, at 1239 (quotation attributed to "An Old
Lawyer").
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